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ABSTRACT
Social networks in any form, specifically online social networks (OSNs), are becoming a part
of our everyday life in this new millennium especially with the advanced and simple com-
munication technologies through easily accessible devices such as smartphones and tablets.
The data generated through the use of these technologies need to be analyzed for foren-
sic purposes when criminal and terrorist activities are involved. In order to deal with the
forensic implications of social networks, current research on both digital forensics and social
networks need to be incorporated and understood. This will help digital forensics investi-
gators to predict, detect and even prevent any criminal activities in different forms. It will
also help researchers to develop new models/techniques in the future. This paper provides
literature review of the social network forensics methods, models, and techniques in order to
provide an overview to the researchers for their future works as well as the law enforcement
investigators for their investigations when crimes are committed in the cyber space. It also
provides awareness and defense methods for OSN users in order to protect them against to
social attacks.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Social Networks Analysis, Online Social Networks, Crime,
Terror, Deception, Social Attacks
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1. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics, a branch of forensic science,
deals with the investigation and recovery of
digital information found in digital devices
which are mostly found at crime/incident
scenes. Early twenty-first century became
the golden age of digital forensics because
of the technological advances in today’s
world. Especially with convenient accessibil-
ity of smart devices, most data are now be-
ing stored and shared in digital forms such
as pictures, diaries, calendars, videos, etc.
Smart phones, tablets, computers, smart
household devices. Moreover, wearable de-
vices have already become part of our ev-
eryday life. The demand towards the us-
age of technological advances makes tremen-
dous amount of data being stored and shared
particularly in online social networks. This
inevitable developments make any device a
storage of potential evidence related to a
crime or an incident.
Any type of information stored or trans-
ferred in digital form can be identified as
digital evidence (Nelson et al., 2015). The
data collected from social networks may con-
tain invaluable evidence for a digital foren-
sics investigator in both criminal and corpo-
rate investigations. For example, social me-
dia is one of the recent developments that at-
tracts everyone regardless of their age, gen-
der, socioeconomic status, etc. and it pro-
duces large amount of digital data for anal-
ysis (Raghavan, 2013).
Social network analysis (SNA) is a method
of using network and graph theories in or-
der to investigate and analyze social struc-
tures for different circumstances (Otte &
Rousseau, 2002). From the digital forensics
investigation point of view, the main goal
of using SNA in forensically sound manner
is to understand the relations (i.e., links or
edges) between the actors (nodes) for variety
of purposes such as solving criminal activi-
ties, preventing terrorist attacks, identifying
social attacks, detecting deceptions, catego-
rizing and matching social network accounts,
etc. Mathematical models, techniques and
tools are developed in order to improve un-
derstanding, preventing, detecting, and pre-
dicting potential criminal activities. There-
fore, it is an absolute need for investigators
and researchers to be familiar with such work
in order to confront with related challenges.
Figure 1 shows sample forensics studies using
OSNs on crime and terror incidents around
the world.
The vast usage of OSNs and availabil-
ity of supporting application interfaces have
attracted significant forensics analysis on
OSNs. Furthermore, the number of offenses
against the law where OSNs are utilized is
also increasing everyday. It is necessary to
understand and analyze crimes and attacks
through online social networks and prevent
criminal activities, detect malicious users,
and solve criminal cases. Moreover, the
safety of OSN users should be increased as
much as possible. We have analyzed nu-
merous papers related to threats mediated
through OSNs. The diversity and numer-
ousness of research studies along with signif-
icant similarities in terms of the ways these
crime/terror networks operate, how social
attacks are designed, and damages caused by
these criminal activities and attacks aggra-
vate feasibility of an effective forensic analy-
sis as well as a comprehensive survey of stud-
ies. In the literature, we have not found a
comprehensive coverage of topics that would
help forensics analysts see the broad picture
of cases and understand existing attacks and
solve their cases. Our approach is not to
list possible threats and cover relevant stud-
ies for each threat. For example, identity-
theft, identity cloning, spam, child pornogra-
phy, finding crime networks have been stud-
ied and solutions have been proposed for
each type of crime or attack. Such cover-
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Figure 1. Map of sample crime analyses around the world
age has limitations for forensics analysts and
typically requires new ways of understanding
with the launch of a new type of attack.
The main goal of this paper is to pro-
vide an extensive review of social network
forensics research that would help to under-
stand various aspects of forensics research
on OSNs starting from crime and terror net-
work structures and their analysis to social
attacks through OSNs, and the countermea-
sure methods against to these attacks. Par-
ticularly, we present relevant research in a
way that necessary tools could be developed
for forensics community, systematic methods
could be designed for solving crimes (initi-
ated through OSNs), and methods for pro-
tecting OSN users are applied effectively.
A survey on social network analysis is
not complete without covering topics related
to crime/terror networks and social attacks.
Therefore we cover both aspects in this sur-
vey. We explain how OSNs can be ana-
lyzed to understand crime and terror net-
work structures, how social attacks are de-
signed, how OSN users could be protected,
and how methods could be developed to help
forensics analysts to detect, solve or pre-
vent social attacks. The major difference be-
tween terror/crime network structures and
social attacks through online social networks
is that the first one is organized by a group of
people whereas the second group of attacks
could be initiated by a single person. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
comprehensive area survey of social network
forensics with respect to aforementioned ob-
jectives. Therefore, the major contribution
of our paper is the organization and cover-
age of diverse research studies on crimes and
attacks, which could have similar damages
or utilize similar methods, to help forensics
community and protect OSN users. More
specifically, our paper has the following con-
tributions:
• a comprehensive overview of research
studies on crime and terror network
structures with focus on analyzing net-
work structures, spatial analysis of
crime networks, ranking individuals and
relationships, identifying co-offending
networks, similarity of crime networks,
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information diffusion related to terror-
ist attacks, and socio-economic relation-
ships affecting crime and terror,
• a novel categorization and analysis of
social attacks through online social net-
works based on proposed four levels of
attacks: (i) crime or criminal activity
(e.g., identity-theft, child pornography),
(ii) type of attack (i.e., information dis-
closure or opinion/emotion influence)
(iii) scheme of attack (social engineer-
ing and information discovery), and (iv)
attack components (fake identity, fake
messaging, fake relationship, and data
crawling) and coverage of literature in-
cluding children-oriented attacks with
respect to this categorization,
• coverage of forensics analysis meth-
ods and protection according to our
categorization of attacks including our
proposed way of categorizing privacy
preservation methods, handling fake
identities (user categorization, pro-
file matching, authorship analysis, de-
tecting deception, defenses for de-
anonymization), handling fake messages
(preventing, detecting, demoting, credi-
bility, improving resilience to infection),
handling fake relationships, and search-
ing traces of data, and
• a detailed list of open research issues
and future direction along with sug-
gestions for OSN users, OSN service
providers, forensics analysts and law en-
forcement agencies.
This paper is organized as follows. The
following section provides research studies
related to understanding analysis of crime
and terror network structures with respect
to ranking individuals and relationships, co-
offending relationships, spatial analysis of
networks, similarity of crime networks, visu-
alization of such networks, information diffu-
sion not only for terror attacks but also for
white-collar crimes, and influence of socio-
economic relationship on crime and terror.
Section 3 discusses social attacks through
online social networks. Forensic analysis and
defense methods for social attacks are par-
ticularly explained in Section 4. Finally, the
last section introduces open research issues
in social network forensics based on currently
available methods and concludes our paper.
2. UNDERSTANDING
CRIME AND TERROR
NETWORK
STRUCTURE
Understanding crime and terror network
structures plays critical role for forensics in-
vestigations. The analysis of these struc-
tures include understanding the rank of in-
dividuals, relationships and roles of peo-
ple, collaboration among individuals and dif-
ferent networks, spatial analysis based on
mobility, and similarity between networks.
Determining the underlying graphs may be
used to crack down these networks and pre-
vent possible attacks. Despite the vital im-
portance of such analysis, currently available
digital forensics tools (both commercial and
open source) are not sophisticated enough
to provide thorough analysis. On the other
hand, there are many research efforts to an-
swer this need individually by focusing on
particular events and incidents.
In Table 1, we categorize relevant research
on network structures along with other fac-
tors that influence crime and terror net-
works. Once the structures are identified,
tools and techniques to further analyze them
becomes necessary. Hence, in this section we
discuss available methods, tools and tech-
niques which are used to analyze network
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structures, perform ranking among the indi-
viduals in criminal networks, measure simi-
larities between the criminal networks, and
investigate diffusion information on these
networks. Furthermore, we also aim to at-
tract digital forensics researchers’ and tool
developers’ attention to these available stud-
ies for their future tool developments on net-
work analysis in a broader sense. In the next
section we start with network structure anal-
ysis using certain metrics on individuals as
well as their relations and behaviors in the
crime and terror networks.
2.1 Network Structure
Analysis
In order to understand the network structure
analysis, it is crucial to grasp centrality met-
rics which are classified as the most known
characteristics of the network analysis. The
Degree centrality is the number of ties that
a node has whereas the betweenness central-
ity is the number of shortest paths from all
vertices to all others that pass through a spe-
cific node averaged over all pairs of node in a
network. The closeness centrality is the sum
of distances to all other nodes. These cen-
tralities may reveal information about links
between individuals and their roles in net-
work structures.
Morselli et al. (2007) investigate Kreb’s
terrorist network (V. Krebs, 2002) and the
Caviar network (UCINET, 2017) in order to
analyze the effects of degree, betweenness,
and closeness centrality criteria, and how
they can be used for the detection of terrorist
networks and criminal enterprise networks.
The Kreb’s terrorist network data consists of
37 participants in which 19 of them are hi-
jackers who executed the attacks and other
18 additional contributing criminals. On the
other hand, the Caviar network includes 110
participants of a profit driven criminal en-
terprise network. The major difference be-
tween these two datasets is that the Kreb’s
terrorist network is described as a snake-like,
sparse network showing substantial distance
within the members of the group whereas the
Caviar’s Network is a cluster-like network
with shorter distances between the members.
In their study, terrorist activities are ob-
served to be operated without a core cen-
trality member or person, whereas criminal
enterprise networks such as drug trafficking
built around the central members. Such
analysis can be used to understand the pur-
pose of forming criminal groups.
Centrality metrics can be also quite useful
when performing analysis on the resilience
of a network. For instance, Piraveenan et
al. (2012) introduce a metric to analyze the
structural robustness of networks by measur-
ing the change of size of the largest compo-
nent with respect to the network node re-
movals. This measure is suitable for random
and sequential node removals. In an ideal ro-
bust network, node removal should decrease
the size of the largest component linearly,
whereas in real networks this decrease could
be nonlinear. Therefore, the robustness co-
efficient can be defined as the ratio of the
size of the largest component in this net-
work to the size of the largest component
in ideal robust network. After defining the
coefficient, Piraveenan et al. (2012) demon-
strated how it can be used to evaluate the
real world network data. An analysis is done
for degree based ordering, betweenness cen-
trality based ordering, and closeness central-
ity based ordering to show that this measure
can be valuable to choose a strategy to at-
tack/defend a network. Degree based attack
analysis is performed by removing the high-
est order node in a network whereas random
attack analysis is performed by removing a
node in random degree order.
The experiment results for different net-
works reveal that cortical networks, neural
networks and food webs show the highest ro-
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Table 1. Overview of studies on network structures and information diffusion
Paper Category Application Data Source
Location
/Attack
Bora et al. (2013) network structure street gangs Twitter Los Angeles
Ozgul & Erdem (2012) identify networks drug network Diyarbakir
Ozgul & Erdem (2012) co-offending criminal &
Bursa,
Diyarbakir
drug networks
Tayebi & Glasser (2012) co-offending
Hipp et al. (2013)
information
diffusion
social tie &
crime relationship
Morselli et al. (2007) network structure leadership Krebs, Caviar
Tayebi et al. (2014) co-offending& Police Information
Metro
Vancouver
spatial behavior Retrieval System
Frank (2001) co-offending offender-crime Stockholm
reporting
relationship
Hipp (2010) socio-econonomics social distance- American
crime relationship Housing Survey
Baker & Faulkner (2004) social network fraud Fountain Oil & Ventura County
communication Gas company California
McBride & Caldara (2013) criminal network
visualization
Semenov et al. (2013) network structure tracking activities vk.com Boston bomber
Burnap et al. (2014)
information
diffusion
survival & volume Twitter Woolwich,
of messages London, UK
Sundsoy et al. (2012) communication Telenor Oslo
&relations (phone calls)
Wiil et al. (2010) network structure link importance
9/11 & 2002
Bali
& removal night attack
Breiger et al. (2014)
groups
connectivity,
drug trading Big Allied and
similarity Dangerous (BAAD-1)
Spezzano et al. (2013) network structure person successor Sageman’s Alqaeda
problem and Lashkar-e-Taiba
Husslage et al. (2015) network structure ranking individuals Al Qaeda 9/11
Schweinberger et al. (2014)
information
diffusion
relief 9/11 Attack
operations
Ozgul et al. (2011) network similarity modus operandi Istanbul
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bustness whereas the Internet networks are
among the least robust networks. This im-
plies that man-made rapidly evolving net-
works are more vulnerable than biological
networks. Lastly the results show that
(i) the networks are more robust to ran-
dom attacks and vulnerable to targeted at-
tacks, and (ii) the networks are least robust
against betweenness centrality based attack
and most robust against closeness centrality
based attacks. Network characteristics pro-
vide invaluable perspectives to better under-
stand the complexity of the crime networks.
Two papers above may not directly reflect
the nature of researches on forensics investi-
gation; however, they provide unique angles
to see already complex structures, namely
terrorist and criminal networks.
In addition to the network analysis from
the centrality metrics perspective, catego-
rization of users by their behaviors, and the
analysis of these categorization in online so-
cial networks can be helpful to extract crim-
inal networks from social networks. For in-
stance, Vigliotti & Hankin (2015) focus on
detecting unidentified criminals by following
a few known criminals on social networks.
They implemented a model derived from bi-
nomial distribution and discrete time models
for behavior classification (normal or abnor-
mal) by checking the instances of the behav-
ior occurrences. The experiments are per-
formed on two datasets: (i) Twitter dataset
containing 11K users followed in a period of
45 weeks and (ii) the VAST dataset contain-
ing 400 users’ phone records over 10 days. A
directed graph (N,E) is constructed where
N represents the number of nodes and E rep-
resents the edges between these nodes. A
time interval can be defined as [tn, t(n+1)],
where tn is the beginning time of an event
and t(n+1) is the end of the event. With re-
spect to time series, relationship of the edges
can be obtained easily by using the equations
below.
Ni.(t) =
∑
j,i6=j
Ni,j(t) (1)
N.j(t) =
∑
i,i 6=j
Ni,j(t) (2)
N..(t) =
∑
j,i6=j
∑
i,i 6=j
Nij(t) (3)
Equation 1 represents the outgoing edges
from node i, Equation 2 represents the in-
coming edges to node i, and the Equation 3
is the count of both outgoing and incoming
connections for node i. Considering time in-
tervals for each event, the time series for each
node can be obtained as dN(t1), dN(t2), . . . ,
dN(tn) where dN(tk) represents the number
of relevant communications between time tk
and tk+1. The probability of a communica-
tion at interval t1 is defined as P (dN(t1)).
The number of communications over n inter-
vals can be specified using a random variable
B(n) = dN(t1) + dN(t2) + . . . + dN(tn) as-
suming that the presence of communication
is sampled using Bernoulli. The probabil-
ity of r communications can simply be com-
puted using the binomial distribution as in
Equation 4:
P(B(n) = r) =
(
n
r
)
pir(1− pi)n−r (4)
The authors use discrete time stochastic pro-
cess to model the connections (e.g., tele-
phone calls) in a network. The links (at least
one communication over interval) between
nodes are sampled using Bernoulli (Be(pi))
while the frequency (r) of links between two
nodes over an n intervals is modeled using
Binomial distribution.
As a result of these experiments, it is
shown that 36 suspects out of 400 users in
VAST dataset are detected. As for the Twit-
ter dataset, roughly 1,600 out of ∼11K Twit-
ter users were detected as suspects. In both
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cases, the number of anomalous nodes stays
below ∼10% of the total population. This
work clearly shows, despite the privacy re-
lated concerns, that publicly available data
on online social networks may be monitored
in order to detect perpetrators and crimi-
nals by knowing the characteristics of known
criminals on online social networks.
Links in a network deliver important in-
sights on analysis of a crime and how it is
committed. In addition to (Vigliotti & Han-
kin, 2015), Semenov et al. (2013) describe
how social media could be helpful for law
enforcement in order to track the traces be-
fore and after a crime is committed. The
authors claim that potential traces can be
found in social media sites in order to pre-
vent crimes if the profiles are analyzed before
the crime is committed. They specifically
take the Boston Bomber case as their fo-
cus and present how activities can be traced.
Data is collected from vk.com (Russia based
social network) using an API provided by
vk.com. Boston Bomber case is first ana-
lyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. The
collected data from one of the suspects’ pro-
file show the dynamics on the terrorists’ al-
leged social media accounts before and af-
ter the attack. They also present data re-
garding the origin of the activities on those
alleged accounts with respect to the com-
ments on suspect’s profile and the number
of contributing users by the country. Sec-
ond, the case is analyzed from the social net-
work analysis point of view. The collected
data consists of 1,208,892 nodes in total in-
cluding the terrorist friends, second degree
friends, and third degree friends. In their
analysis, they show the number of friends
found in the first, second and third degree
friend circles and the origins of these friends
regarding to their countries. They also show
how the suspect’s friends stop following him
after his name appeared on news. In the
meantime, data also show that some the al-
leged suspect’s friends appear in the network
to support him by sharing pictures and posts
of him claiming his innocence.
Most of the time, a single representation
of a network structure may not be enough
to grasp the complete story of the network
where there can be hidden insights. An-
alysts and the investigators need an inte-
grated suite of capabilities that can help
them rapidly understand and glean insight
from a network, visualize knowledge by in-
teracting with data, and collaborate to draw
conclusions. Hence, we now discuss a brief
summary of visualization for crime and ter-
rorist networks particularly on virtual net-
works.
Visualization of networks is studied in or-
der to understand the cognitive recognition
process of human subjects on various net-
work representations. We are aware that
there are other works which merely focus
on visual representations of networks them-
selves without taking human perception into
account (e.g., Chen et al. (2004); J. Xu
& Chen (2005); C. C. Yang & Ng (2007);
Didimo et al. (2011); Chen et al. (2003)).
However, they are out of the scope of this
work.
The presentation of data in a pictorial
or graphical format makes a big difference.
Visual representations such as charts and
maps help understand information more eas-
ily and quickly. In a research conducted by
(McBride & Caldara, 2013), a comparative
study of the data representation in either a
table based or graph based representation is
presented and discussed in order to get more
meaningful visual representation of a crimi-
nal network. A mathematical model is de-
signed in order to demonstrate the criminal
networks. Then, an experiment of three ses-
sions is set up with 86 subjects. Subjects are
shown some networks which are randomly
selected by a computer from a set of 10 out
of 16 networks. The networks are randomly
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generated to illustrate the typical degree dis-
tribution of the social networks. As an out-
come of the experiments, it is stated that a
graph representation leads to a faster disrup-
tion decision on the criminal networks; how-
ever, the table style representation may lead
to a more accurate disruption choice. Even
though there is a trade-off between these two
approaches, using both can give the best re-
sults.
As the above works show, the analyses of
network structures for both terror and crim-
inal groups (including individuals involved)
would provide law enforcement and forensics
examiners quite a bit of knowledge and evi-
dence about the incidents in order to answer
their questions.
2.2 Spatial Analysis of Crime
Networks
In addition to structural network analysis,
spatial analysis is also critical for identifica-
tion of criminal groups and their activities.
Spatial analysis from this aspect aims at
identifying and quantifying spatial relation-
ships and distributions of crime patterns. In
this section, we provide summaries of spa-
tial analysis research focusing on crime net-
works such as identification of the radicaliza-
tion (Mazumder et al., 2013), human behav-
ior and mobility patterns (Bora et al., 2013)
and prediction of the locations of upcoming
criminal activities (Tayebi et al., 2014).
Online social networks can be used to
identify radicalization using the content
and geolocation of tweets of the users.
Mazumder et al. (2013) state that online so-
cial networks provide large amount of infor-
mation on what people feel about other peo-
ple, places, events, and political activities,
etc.. As a part of the Minerva project at
Arizona State University, activity informa-
tion of the twitter users has been collected to
understand political activities of Indonesia.
Based on these data, a heat map is gener-
ated for the radical activities in provinces of
Indonesia by computing radicalization index
and location index of each Twitter user from
Indonesia. Rather than considering tweets
individually, all data of a user are analyzed.
A degree of radicalism is assigned to each
user based on the content of his or her tweets.
Since Twitter API provides geolocation of
tweets, it is possible to track the location of
a user based on his or her tweets. Hence, ge-
olocation is used as another parameter. Con-
sidering tweets for the same user might have
been posted in different provinces, a proba-
bility distribution estimate is used per user.
Results show high accuracy in detecting rad-
icalism in users’ tweets. The higher the value
in the radicalism index, the higher the radi-
calism is in the province.
Mobile devices, on the other hand, gener-
ate enormous amount of data from location
services. These data help model human be-
havior and mobility patterns. The study in
(Bora et al., 2013) aims to observe human
movement to understand the relationships
of geographical regions, neighborhoods, and
gang territories by analyzing 10 million geo-
graphically tagged tweets from Los Angeles.
Using a graph based representation of street
gang territories as vertices, and interactions
between them as edges, they train a machine
learning classifier (i.e., Naive Bayes Classi-
fier) in order to distinguish the rival and
non-rival links. They were able to correctly
identify 89% of the true rivalry network,
which beats a standard baseline by about
30%. Looking at larger neighborhoods, they
were able to show that the distance traveled
from home follows a power-law distribution,
and the direction of displacement (i.e., the
distribution of movement direction) can be
used as a profile to identify physical (or ge-
ographic) barriers when it is not uniform.
Finally, considering the temporal dimension
of tweets, they have detected events taking
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place around the city by identifying irregu-
larities in tweeting patterns. This method
can be easily adapted to create new tools for
law enforcement to detect outbreaks led by
gangs and other criminal actors in real time.
In addition to real time event detection, it
is also possible to predict future criminal ac-
tivities. In order to do that, spatial behavior
of criminals can be analyzed to predict the
whereabouts of their upcoming criminal ac-
tivities. Tayebi et al. (2014) propose a prob-
abilistic model on the well-known offend-
ers’ spatial behavior and an extended ver-
sion of earlier random walk model derived by
Short et al. (2008), CRIMETRACER, which
brings functionality to generate the activity
space associated with the offenders living in
an urban area. In CRIMETRACER, ran-
dom walk process is personalized by using
co-offending information, crime trends of of-
fenders, and also the crime event history of
road segments in order to uncover the un-
known spatial behavior of every single of-
fender. The data is retrieved from the Police
Information Retrieval System (PIRS) which
particularly focuses on crimes in Metro Van-
couver, where there is a road network com-
posed of 64,108 road segments with an aver-
age length 0.2 km. In CRIMETRACER, the
first task is to get the list of an offender’s
crime events chronologically. Then, it gener-
ates the offender’s activity space by training
the model with the first 80% of the crime
data. The rest of the data (the crime loca-
tions in particular) are used for testing the
model. In the evaluation, offenders with at
least two different crime locations are consid-
ered, which corresponds to ∼10% of the of-
fenders in the crime data set. The results of
CRIMETRACER are evaluated with meth-
ods such as random walk, hot spots, prox-
imity, offender-based collaborative filtering
(CF), location-based CF, co-offending-based
CF which are similar to the state-of-the-
art methods for location recommendation.
CRIMETRACER exceeds all other methods
which are used in the experiments.
2.3 Ranking Individuals and
Relationships in Crime
Networks
As discussed above, nodes represent the ac-
tive objects in the terror and crime networks.
In many cases, nodes establish, maintain,
and control the events occurring in the net-
work. In this section, we explain research
studies which particularly focus on analyz-
ing the ranking of individuals and criminals
(Sarvari et al., 2014; Husslage et al., 2015),
importance of links between the nodes (Wiil
et al., 2010), and the person successor prob-
lem (Spezzano et al., 2013).
Sarvari et al. (2014) suggest that informa-
tion regarding the organization of a crimi-
nal community can be achieved by analyzing
criminal social graph structures. Sarvari et
al. (2014) aim to construct a large scale so-
cial graph from a small set of email addresses
of some criminals. By using the Facebook
profiles that were associated with these email
addresses, they constructed a social graph
of 43,000 nodes using 1,000 email addresses.
Then, a large scale analysis was performed
on this graph to identify profiles of high rank
criminals, criminal organizations, and large
scale communities of criminals. Finally, a
manual analysis was performed on these pro-
files to detect many public criminal groups
on Facebook. The data (email addresses)
were collected from BestRecovery (V. Krebs,
2002), an online data theft service. Cen-
trality measures and community detection
techniques were used to determine criminals
having a central position in the graph, sub-
groups and communities found in the net-
work, criminals acting as brokers of collabo-
ration and information in the network, and
the ranking of criminals based on their im-
portance and influence on the network. It
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was shown that the key members of the net-
works had high ranks with respect to ev-
ery centrality measure. The similar results
were observed with the PageRank dataset
(Page et al., 1999) as well. This shows that
highly connected members are positioned in
the center of the graph. This also indicates
that they have connections with other well-
connected members. If we take the readily
available social network websites and corre-
sponding data collection tools into account,
it would be indispensable technique for law
enforcement to identify and eventually elim-
inate key figures in such criminal communi-
ties.
In addition to the identification of key
players in terrorist networks, the terrorist
networks can also be used for ranking indi-
viduals and ultimately preventing likely ter-
rorist attacks. Husslage et al. (2015) in-
troduce a new game theoretic model as an
extension of (Lindelauf et al., 2011). In
addition to the earlier work, this method
also takes the operational strength of con-
nected networks into account. The ultimate
aim of the proposed model is two-fold: pro-
viding certain strategies to prevent possible
terrorist attacks, and destabilizing the ter-
rorist networks by ranking the individuals
based on their importance in the terrorist
networks. Authors used sensitivity analy-
sis on the rankings gathered from the Al
Qaeda’s 9/11 dataset (Kean et al., 2004)
(B. Krebs, 2013) for the purpose of test-
ing the robustness of their model. During
the analysis, they took possible additional
information of the network members, vari-
ations in relational strengths, and the ab-
sence or presence of a small percentage links
in the network into account. Their proposed
game theoretic model was developed by us-
ing monotonic weighted connectivity game.
This model is used to calculate the centrality
measure of the network. In the rest of this
work, the authors used sensitivity analysis
methods to test their models’ robustness un-
der different circumstances including small
variations in the weights, addition/deletion
of a small portion of the links, and changes
in the weights related to interactions. The
results show that their model is robust in a
sense that it is able to rank the individuals
in the network despite small changes in the
dataset. Considering the successful appli-
cations of game theoretic models into many
real life problems particularly in security re-
lated issues (Zhang et al., 2013; Jiang et al.,
2014; Delle Fave et al., 2014), we expect to
see more of similar methods being applied to
various digital forensics domains in addition
to (Husslage et al., 2015).
Thus far, we have discussed the impor-
tance of the nodes in various network analy-
sis methods. However, the links of a network
may play a critical role as its nodes with re-
spect to network efficiency and secrecy. Wiil
et al. (2010) aim to determine which link
rather than node is playing more crucial role
in communication, and also whether or not
removing the respective link affects the se-
crecy and efficiency of the network. After an-
alyzing the current available strategies, the
authors implemented a method to analyze
the importance of links in a terrorist network
based on a transportation network (which
is later implemented in CrimeFighter As-
sistant (Wiil et al., 2010)) and other well-
known terrorist attacks. The idea of this
method/technique is originated from the so-
cial networking analysis concept. In this pro-
posed concept, removal of an important link
from the network is expected to result desta-
bilization of the network, since removing the
link would result in connection or commu-
nication loss between the connecting nodes.
This work was claimed to be the first imple-
mentation of the secrecy and efficiency mea-
sures when analyzing the link importance.
After the complete analysis on the trans-
portation network, a balanced view is pre-
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sented for analyzing the data of a terrorist
network by giving importance to links. Later
this algorithm was tested on the well-known
attacks such as 9/11 network and 2002 Bali
night club bombing network. This algorithm
was implemented in the CrimeFighter Assis-
tant and compared with other approaches.
The authors show that the measure of link
importance proposes ways to view the im-
portant links that affect the performance of
the terrorist networks for their destabiliza-
tion.
Now we discuss the link formation in a
social network after a critical node is re-
moved in addition to above study on link
removal. We believe this method may also
help law enforcement to determine succes-
sor of a terrorist leader in terrorist networks
when particular nodes are removed. Spez-
zano et al. (2013) present theoretical models
in order to study the Person Successor Prob-
lem (PSP) by analyzing person replacements
in terrorist groups. They aim to reduce the
lethality of the terrorist groups by predict-
ing the possible replacements when an im-
portant figure (e.g., leader of the terrorist
group) is removed. They also aim to pre-
dict the new structure of the network af-
ter removal is performed. This work takes
the property and expertise of the individu-
als in terrorist networks into account when
predicting the changes in the network. The
authors developed two algorithms, STONE-
Predict and STONE-Reshape. These al-
gorithms use a probability density function
based on a probabilistic model in order to
predict the person replacement and the re-
shaping of the network. These algorithms
are tested on three datasets. The first
dataset is synthetic dataset created by the
authors. The second and third datasets
are Sageman’s Al-Qaeda network Sageman
(2004) and Lashkar-e-Taiba network Subrah-
manian et al. (2012) respectively. The re-
sults show that STONE-Predict algorithm
achieves 80% accuracy of predicting who will
replace the removed person in the network
when tested on those datasets. In testing,
the information in real datasets were used
as ground truth, and domain experts were
consulted. This work shows that collection
of good data regarding terrorist of crime
networks (e.g., Project Caviar (UCINET,
2017)) and using proposed algorithms after
analyzing the dataset may eventually help to
diminish these networks by identifying the
key figures and their successors.
2.4 Identifying Co-offending
in Crime Networks
Collaborative crimes end up with bigger
impact and hazardous results. That is
why well-structured terrorist groups become
threats known globally. Having a network
with high density complicates the under-
standing of the organization and the control
dynamics of a network. Identification of the
co-offending characteristics of a crime net-
work provides insights for defense and se-
curity purposes. In this section, we pro-
vide overview on identification of the fea-
tures which lead to committing crimes by
Ozgul & Erdem (2013), partnership mod-
eling and analysis of criminal networks by
Tayebi & Glasser (2012); Frank (2001).
Identifying features that lead to commit-
ting crimes in a collaboration is impor-
tant for forensics research. Ozgul & Erdem
(2013) studied the identification of the crime
features which are important for committing
crime together. In their methodology, they
first collected the co-offending connections of
the criminals which represent the previous
cooperation. Second, the spatio-temporal
and modus operandi are used to identify the
criminal networks. Third, they combined
latter two outcomes to conclude whether
it can help for detection of current crim-
inal networks. Finally, demographic simi-
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larities of the criminals are used to observe
the current networks. Two criminal network
datasets from Turkey were used in their ex-
periments: Bursa and Diyarbakir. Bursa
dataset consists of 6,114 crimes, 478 crim-
inals in 85 experimental criminal networks;
on the other hand, Diyarbakir dataset con-
tains 40 drug networks with about 56 crimes
and 154 criminal records. The authors con-
clude that the history of the criminal connec-
tivity plays a very important role in the cur-
rent criminal networks. On the other hand
the type of crime may differ but does not
depend on the demographic characteristics.
Moreover, analyzing partnerships between
criminals or criminal networks can help to
understand co-offending networks. Tayebi &
Glasser (2012) proposed a co-offending net-
work analysis which can be handled benefit-
ing from the social network analysis with the
use of machine learning techniques. Their
methodology is divided into four sections:
modeling the crime data and extraction of
the co-offending network, a group detec-
tion technique that is an extension of the
clique percolation method, crime determina-
tion process that produces the same char-
acteristics of the crimes, and an evaluation
model that can analyze the groups in a
time period. In the data modeling, a crime
data is modeled as a tripartite hyper graph
H(N,E) where each node in N is catego-
rized as actors (A) such as criminals, vic-
tims, suspects, etc., incidents (I) that are
the reported crimes, and resources (R) that
are used in a crime such as vehicle, weapon,
etc. A co-offending network is derived from
the nodes connected to each other for the
crimes they are involved together. Discovery
of a crime group is derived by an algorithm
that first collects the offender groups from
the data, computes the activity and crimi-
nality scores based on the crimes committed
by members, determines the resources ben-
efited by the members, identifies the groups
that are likely to be crime organizations, and
updates the group evaluation results for each
time frame. Dataset used in this project con-
sists of roughly 4.4 million reported offenses,
∼4 million unique individuals, and 39 dif-
ferent subject groups. Five datasets in dif-
ferent sizes (with 9K to 21K data entries)
are chronologically divided and used. How-
ever, only offenses with more than one of-
fender are considered. As a result, from ∼4.4
million crime records with 150K co-offending
networks, 20K of the offender groups are de-
tected in which 1,800 of them were active. It
is stated that a continuous crime partnership
is observed and most of them do not endure
for long periods.
In addition to partnership of offenders,
relationship between offenders and victims
can also be modeled in order to analyze
and understand the network infrastructure.
Frank (2001) discusses a statistical network
model that can help to predict the secondary
participation of crimes and understand the
structure of co-offending youth networks.
The juvenile crime data in Stockholm is used
such that a bipartite graph model of the data
is built from assumptions about crime re-
porting and offender detection for a specific
type of crimes. A mathematical modeling of
a basic crime model, related crimes and co-
offending crime models are given as a matrix
representation. In the given representations,
a connectivity is defined as an adjacency ma-
trix to come up with a simple probabilistic
model for crime reporting and offender iden-
tification. Statistical inference (in particu-
lar, the number of co-offenders and the total
number of offenses) is discussed. The au-
thor shows that it can be possible to present
the numbers of offenders of different activi-
ties and estimate the total number of offenses
by the model parameters via the numbers of
crimes of different sizes.
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2.5 Measuring Similarity of
Crime Networks
Criminals and terrorists may form alliances,
operate as an underground network, and
share operational motivations. By analyzing
the similarities of crime networks, it may be
possible to determine the purpose of a newly
detected crime networks. In this section, we
deliver summaries on detection of the crim-
inals based on their demographic features
(Ozgul & Erdem, 2012), two-mode network
analysis for understanding the formation and
involvement of the terrorist groups in drug
trading (Breiger et al., 2014), a similarity
metric extraction based on development of
the crime and the behaviors of the criminals
(Ozgul et al., 2011).
Demographic features such as kinship can
be effective for detection of the secondary
(other) criminals in the network. Ozgul &
Erdem (2012) propose an Extended Social
Detection Model (XSDM), which aims to
detect criminals by their demographic fea-
tures such as ethnic origins, kinship, etc.
Their model is a successor model of the
Social Detection Model (SODM) (Ozgul et
al., 2010). A set of new features such as
neighborhood information which represents
the criminals who live in the same loca-
tion are included to the new model. Their
method is composed of the following steps:
(i) link creation, (ii) populating link weights,
(iii) graph representation generation, (iv) de-
tecting criminal networks, and (v) evaluat-
ing the detection results by using precision,
recall, and f-measure calculations. They
have performed their experiments on Di-
yarbakir Drug Network data collected from
Diyarbakir, a province in the southeastern
Turkey. The dataset consists of 2,552 in-
dividuals, and 221 previously known drug
dealing networks (DDN). The experiments
were conducted on different packages such as
R, RODBC, RBGL, igraph, SNA, etc. Out
of 221 DDNs, 81 criminal networks were de-
tected. As a result, by using the proposed
XSDM model, 0.88 precision, 0.39 recall, and
0.51 f-value results are obtained which are
better than the predecessor model, SODM.
High precision and respectively low recall in-
dicates that their method is reliable when a
criminal network is detected, but it may miss
a lot of other criminal networks.
The social networks may also be analyzed
on whether if they serve to a specific purpose
such as drug trading. Breiger et al. (2014)
aim to analyze how terrorist groups are in-
volved in drug trading by generalizing two-
mode network analysis method. They used a
limited set of 12 distinct properties (6 binary
variables and their complements) shown in
Table 2 to analyze terrorists’ drug trading in-
volvements. They used the data from one of
the most extensive public datasets called as
Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD-1) (Asal
et al., 2009). This dataset contains terror-
ist activities and attributes of 395 terror-
ist groups that were known to be active in
65 countries between 1998 and 2005. The
analysis model presented in this paper is
an extension (dual-mode) to Ragins Qual-
itative Comparative Analysis (QCA) tech-
niques (Ragin & Rihoux, 2009). The au-
thors compared their findings with another
method called Barycentric correspondence
analysis (Greenacre, 1984). The analysis re-
sults for different test cases show different ac-
curacies depending on the number of param-
eters used in the configuration. The highest
accuracy rate that an analyst is predicting
the drug trading achieved in one configura-
tion is 78% while random guess only pro-
vides 9% accuracy since the database shows
only 35 out of 395 groups are known to be
involved in drug smuggling. With the best
configuration which covers the groups’ con-
nectivity and similarity based on the given
parameters, the highest hit rate of 78% could
be achieved. As for the confidence intervals
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Table 2. Limited set of 12 distinct properties
Variable/Complement Description
DRUG (D)/drug (d) Drug trade involvement (yes/no)
CBRN (C)/cbrn (c) Chemical, biological, radio-logical, or nuclear weapon usage (yes/no)
DEGR (D)/degr (d) Network degree level (high/low)
TERS (T)/ters (t) Control level of territory (strong/weak)
ETHN (E)/ethn (e) Founding ideology that emphasized ethnicity (yes/no)
SIZE (S)/size (s) Size of the network (large/small)
for consistency and coverage measures, this
work achieves 95% confidence interval when
the highest accuracy is achieved.
The terrorist networks can be compared
based on the way they commit or orga-
nize crimes. Ozgul et al. (2011) aim to de-
velop a similarity metric for terrorist net-
works in Istanbul, Turkey. This work is
based on the ways that crimes are commit-
ted and behaviors of terrorist groups with
respect to their modus operandi. The au-
thors developed crime ontology based sim-
ilarity measure (COSM) model. In this
model, they used Direct Acyclic Graph for
developing crime ontology. After creating
the ontology, links are weighted in the net-
work. After all the links are calculated, ter-
rorist network similarity scores are deter-
mined based on the model. In order to test
their model, authors used Istanbul terror-
ist networks dataset. This dataset contains
attacks committed by 40 terrorist groups
in 2005, 2006, and 2007. In their exper-
iments, authors show the similarity scores
which are calculated using COSM. The au-
thors evaluated their model using COSM as
well as other similarity measure such as Co-
sine similarity and Jaccard similarity. They
report that COSM creates better clustering
based on the similarity scores than the other
two methods. They also validated their re-
sults with domain experts (i.e., law enforce-
ment). However, experts criticized COSM
just solely being dependent on a crime and
modus operandi similarity. It was recom-
mended to expand COSM’s capabilities by
adding more attributes such as location and
date/time preference of terrorists.
2.6 Information Diffusion
The online social networks can be used as
online community watch to stop or solve
crimes due to fast data propagation in the
network. The connectivity and fast infor-
mation sharing in social networks may be
helpful for stopping or solving crimes. Ac-
cording to (Zafarani et al., 2014), there ex-
ist four general types of information diffu-
sion. These are herd behavior, information
cascades, diffusion of innovation, and epi-
demics. Herd behavior is related to when
individuals act upon actions of all others.
In information cascades, people only observe
their neighbors. Diffusion of innovations is
helpful in terms of observing how innova-
tions spread across a population. Finally,
epidemic models are similar to diffusion of
innovations where infection is used instead
of adoption.
In sympathetic situations, information
tend to spread more attentively. Emotions
in such cases help people more in getting in-
volved with the problem. Information dif-
fusion on Facebook with respect to carjack-
ing was investigated by (Dingli, 2012). In
case that owner learns that his or her car is
stolen, the owner does everything which can
help to recover the vehicle. Besides report-
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ing the incident immediately to the police,
the owner informs his or her own network
of friends about the misfortune. Facebook’s
Graph API (Facebook, 2005) was used in or-
der to investigate a stolen car case and how
people create the appeal in Facebook and
what information is shared. As every ob-
ject in Graph API is represented by a unique
ID, Mr. L’s profile unique ID is used in or-
der to collect data from his wall’s properties
via the Graph API. A part of his car’s plate
number is used to search for posts relating
to the stolen car case. The results show that
the post which propagated most was shared
30 times, and more than 3 comments were
made on the photo. On other hand, more
than 37% of the users passively followed sta-
tus messages of their friends and reacted on
them by writing comments. Due to the well-
connected structure of the nodes in social
networks as well as very locally clustered
connectivity, it can be said that the vast ma-
jority of connections span a short distance by
looking at how data propagates. Also, some
other findings are (i) posting in specific time
periods has a huge impact on the durabil-
ity of data propagation (how long a message
gets attention) and (ii) user-generated posts
generate much more interactions in terms of
‘shares’ than the automated posts.
Another natural scenario where people
tend to reach information about their loved
ones is in the case of terrorist attacks. Af-
ter the announcement of such tragic events
of which people feel emotional and urge to
make sure the ones they love have made it
through such events. From this extend, in-
formation diffusion for the after effects of a
terrorist attack in Woolwich, London, UK
was investigated by (Burnap et al., 2014).
After a terrorist attack, the size (or volume)
of information flow on a topic as well as
how long (survival) this topic keeps interest
among people are analyzed by studying so-
cial, temporal, and content measures. The
data was derived from the Twitter based on
the retweeting action related to the Wool-
wich terrorist attack. In this work, differ-
ent predictive methods are used and com-
pared. For example, Zero Truncated Neg-
ative Binomial (ZTNB) regression method
(King, 1989) is used because of the plot-
ted distribution gathered using dependent
size measure where the Cox regression tech-
nique (StatsDirect, 2017) is used in order to
model survival. The principal component
analysis is also used to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the predictors like social, tempo-
ral, and content factors of the tweet. Based
on the information diffusion, five hypotheses
were proposed to predict the size and sur-
vival of information flow. The hypotheses
are based on sentiment and tension, online
and oﬄine media association, linking content
features such as URLs and hashtags, etc.
Data collected from Twitter streaming API
about Woolwich tweets are subjected to pre-
processing and re-coding prior to modeling.
In the pre-processing and re-coding stage, a
number of tweets are extracted and analysis
is performed based on the retweeting action
while filtering cases having retweeting size
less than five times. This extracted data is
modeled using the predictors of size and sur-
vival based on the aforementioned five hy-
potheses.
The analysis revealed significant changes
between the independent and dependent
variables of size and survival of information
flow adjoining a terrorist attack. It has been
shown that the main factors for predicting
the size and survival of information flow in
the event were temporal, social, and con-
tent factors. While oﬄine media was a bet-
ter predictor for the size of information flow,
the tension in tweets was determined to be
better indicator of survival of information
flow. Interestingly, it was concluded that
social factors provided the largest amount
of variance for the size, and content factors
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showed the predictive flow of information for
the survival. Individual perception varies de-
pending on the interest and burst of enthu-
siasm which leads to rapid increase or de-
crease in information propagation as some-
times interest may fade at early stages of
tweets which eventually may reduce its life-
time. The lifespan of tweets can be increased
by using URLs or hashtags with combina-
tion of positive expression and low tension
for events like terrorist attacks.
Since social network platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter are not the only ones
to perform communication, other communi-
cation media can also be studied for infor-
mation diffusion. One of the alternatives is
mobile phone operators. Communication be-
tween users of such operators can also be an-
alyzed for studying information diffusion.
(Sundsoy et al., 2012) study how the us-
age of mobile devices increases at the time of
an occurrence of an unexpected event such
as 22 July Oslo Bombing. The main focus
of this paper is to show people’s behavior
in terms of their communication preferences
when they need to reach out their core social
networks when it is urgent. The phone data
retrieved from only single phone operator in
Norway called Telenor is analyzed. Each
person in the network represents a node and
the number of calls between the nodes rep-
resents the degree of closeness of one node
to another. The stronger the relation is the
more number of calls are expected. This
data is analyzed to observe how the num-
ber of calls increased during the bombing.
It also shows that, as expected, people tend
to call their closest relations first, and then
call other relations. The data is also ana-
lyzed for geographical spreading in the area
when the bombing occurred. The results
show that the call activation closer to the
explosion area increases 4 times when com-
pared to an hour before the bombing. The
data does not contain the actual location of
the user at the time of the incident, instead
it contains the postal code of the subscriber
who may not be at the incident scene. This
misleading location information might have
caused detection of many people who are far
from the incident calling many other that
are also far from the incident. However, it
is hard to verify this result without knowing
actual locations of callers and people being
called.
Organizational response of the partici-
pants and/or coordinators of relief cam-
paigns to a terrorist attack is another impor-
tant topic. Studying their impact on over-
all effectiveness on recovery can be analyzed
to improve forensics resilience and prepared-
ness. In Schweinberger et al. (2014), au-
thors study the aftermath effects of the dis-
aster that happened in the U.S. on Septem-
ber 11th, 2001 on the World Trade Cen-
ter. It focused on the inter-organizational
networks that emerged in response to the
attacks to clarify few questions for helping
develop a plan for future responses to such
similar unexpected disasters. The three im-
portant questions are (i) determining the or-
ganizations participating in the disaster re-
sponse and why/how they contribute, (ii)
assessing whether these organizations were
given the coordinator role or emerged as co-
ordinators, and (iii) the ability to absorb dis-
turbances to the disaster response. Bayesian
framework is utilized to provide answers to
the above questions. This framework allows
organizations to collaborate and take respec-
tive characteristics (covariates) into account
to determine whether there is an excess of
transitivity using the Bayesian score test.
The dataset is generated from the rescue and
relief operations by the September 11, 2001
attacks Bevc (2010). It includes 717 orga-
nizations with two attributes: the scale of
operations categorized as local, state, inter-
national, and national, and the type of or-
ganization as collective, governmental, non-
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profit, and profit. Based on the data col-
lected from different sources, it was evident
that small organizations were more collabo-
rative in the disaster response. Network re-
dundancy can help in absorbing the distur-
bances that reduce the ability to coordinate
in the disaster response. So, the evaluation
of the network redundancy in the form of
transitivity was of prime interest. By evalu-
ating the results performed by the Bayesian
framework, it was concluded that small orga-
nizations dominated the inter-organizational
network and a few dominating organizations
behaved as formal coordinators.
There are advantages and disadvantages
of having emergent and formal coordinators
in disaster response. While they may help
to spread information as a point of contact,
they may also become bottleneck for the dis-
aster response. As a result, it was concluded
that formal coordinators cannot take all bur-
den of disaster response. They should be
aware of emergent coordinators and provide
necessary resources for them. While net-
work redundancy may reduce disturbances
to the response, the key coordinators should
be protected and functional for proper to
progress of the response. At last, Bayesian
framework proved to be simple and outper-
formed other computational models with less
computational time with and without con-
sidering covariates. We believe that a similar
framework could also be used for resilience
and preparedness of forensics investigations
as the first responders may collaborate to
response to such catastrophic events when
they occur.
2.7 Influence of
Socio-Economic
Relationships on Crime
and Terror
Drawing a false or unjustified connection
between financial aspects and terrorism
may lead researchers to incorrect decisions.
Therefore, understanding the causes of ter-
rorism in socio-economical relationships are
essential if an effective strategy is to be
crafted to fight against it. In many cases, the
relationship between the crime and the crim-
inal is directly related to financial, demo-
graphic, and ethnic background of the crim-
inals. Thus, we distinguished this section
to include socio-economical relationships of
the criminal and terrorist activities. We
provided summaries and brief insights with
respect to; (i) crime rates affected by ties
among the neighborhoods and the crime and
disorder distribution of the individuals along
with their mobility between the neighbor-
hoods Hipp et al. (2013); Hipp (2010), (ii)
investigation on loss of capital with the in-
fluence of social networks Baker & Faulkner
(2004).
In earlier studies, criminologists show that
network ties among neighborhood residents
may impact crime rates. Hipp et al. (2013)
propose to simulate network ties specula-
tively and construct structural network in
lack of links between pairs in a social en-
vironment. They spatially locate the house-
holds in a city. Then, they employ spatial
interaction functions and simulate a network
of social ties among these residents. After
building the simulated network environment,
they compute network statistics. Later on,
these statistics are further analyzed in order
to extract the notions of cohesion and infor-
mation diffusion which underlie theories of
networks and crime.
This study focuses specifically on five
cities in the United States (i.e., Buffalo,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Sacramento, and
Tucson) for which they aggregated data
on the actual occurrence of reported crime
events between 2000 and 2002. Their com-
bined census data consisted of information
about the number of households in a block
along with the number of persons in each
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household. A limitation of this data was
the induction, a degree of uncertainty re-
garding to the number of persons in these
units, which they have placed the extra per-
sons randomly throughout the block. Their
results show that these network statistics
are robust predictors of crime levels in sev-
eral cities. The results on information flow
present a strong negative effect on crime
rates in the models aggregated to small units
(blocks), but a weaker effect in models aggre-
gated to block groups.
Demographic characteristics and regional
closeness can be correlated in order to ob-
serve social patterns and criminal activities.
Hipp (2010) proposes a new social distance
measure based on the demographic charac-
teristics of people who live in a region. The
aim of this work is to analyze the crime and
disorder distribution of individuals and mo-
bility between the neighborhoods. The sub-
sample of American Housing Survey (AHS)
- U.S. Census Bureau (2013) was used to
evaluate the social distance between 11 res-
idents of more than 650 blocks for three
time periods. Social distance measure is de-
rived from economic differences, education,
race/ethnicity, and the life course factors as:
sdij =
1
K
K∑
k=1
|(xik − xjk)Φk| (5)
where K is the number of social factors, xik
and xjk are the values of factor k for each
individual i and j, and Φk is the salience
of factor k. After populating a matrix of
social distances based on Equation 5, Hipp
(2010) analyzed the results using a hierar-
chical model which consists of two levels:
(i) individual parameters and (ii) the micro-
neighborhood measures. The social distance
had a significant effect on crimes and disor-
der such that more distant individuals of the
society are showing more tendency to get in-
volved in a disorder or a crime.
Influence of social networks on loss of cap-
ital has attracted the attention of economic
sociologists and white-collar criminologists
with opposite views. While economic so-
ciologists claim that social ties benefit the
investors, white-collar criminologists believe
that social ties yield high probability of loss
of capital. Baker & Faulkner (2004) stud-
ied a test case on a legitimate business that
committed fraud. An oil and gas enter-
prise, Fountain Oil & Gas Company (Foun-
tain) with its 230 investors, is used as a case
study. Data was gathered from the District
Attorneys Office of Ventura County, Cali-
fornia, and the receiver appointed by the
bankruptcy court. The data include detailed
records of bank accounts, financial transac-
tions, and lists of all properties (including
investor, amount, well, and date) for all in-
vestors of Fountain. Later they surveyed
the investors regarding whether they lost or
earned money and the reason of using social
networks (if they used). Total of 72 investors
were interviewed which corresponds to 31%
of the data. As a result, they concluded
that people who do not use social ties (79%
probability of loss) or rely on pre-existing
social ties or prior investors without using
due diligence deal with higher probability of
loss (49%) than people who utilize within-
network exchange with due diligence (14%).
In this study, pre-existing social ties played
a beneficial and protective role for investors.
Existing social ties, demographic char-
acteristics, and living nearby expands the
human interactions on both sociologically
and criminally. Socio-economical aspects on
crime and terror reflect invaluable insights
on understanding the spread of crime and
terror within the neighborhoods, friendships
and social networks. Aforementioned stud-
ies that are discussed in this section provide
an interesting perspective which has to be
expanded and investigated more deeply.
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2.8 Summary
With the increase of terrorist activities
around the globe nowadays; it becomes quite
clear that researchers should spend more ef-
forts on understanding both organized crime
and terrorist networks. The crime and ter-
rorist networks are getting more complex
while the diversity of these violent groups are
increasing. Moreover, wide and easy avail-
ability of the Internet provides convenient
connectivity not only for the peaceful citi-
zens of the globe, but also provides a com-
mon ground for the crime groups by enabling
them to establish worldwide connectivity for
their outreach, recruitment and propaganda
(Weimann, 2004; Farwell, 2014; Archetti,
2015; Tuttle, 2016). Created by innocent in-
tentions, the online social networks became
the playground for these groups where a
broad portfolio of criminal activities are cre-
ated, shared and operated. Moreover, mem-
bers of these crime groups became experts
and professionals within the networks. In
order to understand current challenges and
develop countermeasures for these criminals
and their activities, one should put tremen-
dous amount of effort on understanding the
underlying infrastructures of the terrorist
networks on the online social networks.
Previous research studies conducted by
J. N. Shapiro (2005), Tucker (2008), Bjel-
opera (2012) and Csermely et al. (2013) have
shown that the formation of crime groups
has changed from centralized structure to
cell networks where a small number of peo-
ple know each other in a huge crime net-
work where these people act more or less
autonomously by the help of digital com-
munication technologies. They have imple-
mented their own networks within the social
networks. Moreover, they created their own
experts for encryption and secure communi-
cation.
The studies we have put together in this
section deliver both complementary and di-
verging insights on the infrastructure anal-
ysis of the activities of organized crime and
terrorist networks from various perspectives.
We believe understanding of these studies
will create awareness as well as help to de-
velop technological advancements for pos-
sible countermeasures for law enforcement
agencies.
3. SOCIAL ATTACKS
THROUGH ONLINE
SOCIAL NETWORKS
We define social attacks mediated through
OSNs as attacks that benefit from informa-
tion available or extracted from OSNs and
might result in loss of property, damage to
property, loss of life, loss of reputation, fi-
nancial loss, and criminal activity.
Attacks through OSNs are critical as users
may not be aware of the actual person whom
they interact with. Moreover, information
posted or spread through OSNs may ad-
versely affect people’s behavior in their daily
life. While increasing recognition and rep-
utation through OSNs, it is possible that
some sensitive information is also available
to attackers. For example, re-identification
and de-anonymization attacks are possible
for especially identity-theft purposes (Gao
et al., 2011). It is important to under-
stand and categorize these attacks, develop
defenses and protection methods before un-
desired outcomes occur, and identify attack-
ers in case of criminal activities. There are
responsibilities of OSN users, OSN service
providers, third-party application develop-
ers, and friends and relatives of these OSN
users to thwart attacks. We explain possible
types of attacks in this section.
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3.1 Anatomy of Attacks
through Online Social
Networks
We start with explaining how attacks
through online social networks are typically
analyzed and then we provide our way of un-
derstanding and categorizing these social at-
tacks for forensics analysis.
3.1.1 Related Work on
Categorization of Attacks
There has been significant amount of work
related to online social networks. In the lit-
erature, in general, the security issues and
possible threats are listed and categorized
based on their similarities, outcomes, or
methods used by these attacks. Joe & Ra-
makrishnan (2014) discuss a survey of vari-
ous security issues in online social networks
and list a number of security issues result-
ing from image tagging, email spam attack,
social phishing, and sharing day-to-day ac-
tivities. It is also possible to see other ways
of categorizing the list of threats or security
issues in the literature.
Attacks are categorized into privacy
breaches, viral marketing, network struc-
tural attacks, and malware attacks by Gao
et al. (2011). Privacy breaches may result
from the service provider, other users, or
third party applications. Fire, Goldschmidt,
& Elovici (2014) categorize threats into
classic, modern, combined, and children-
oriented threats. Classic threats include
malware, phishing attacks, spammers, cross-
site scripting (XSS), and internet fraud.
Modern attacks include clickjacking, de-
anonymization attacks, face recognition,
fake profiles, identity clone attacks, infer-
ence attacks, information leakage, location
leakage, and socware. Combined attacks
try to exploit both classic and modern at-
tacks to deploy a more sophisticated attack.
Children-oriented attacks target children.
OSN attacks are also categorized into
forging nodes/identities and forging social
links/connections by (Zhang et al., 2010).
Attackers might be an insider from the OSN
or outsider to disrupt the OSN. Insider at-
tackers might include OSN service provider,
third party application provider, another
user, or anyone who gets access to the net-
work structure.
3.1.2 Categorizing Attacks for
Forensics Analysis
There are numerous types of attacks through
OSNs. Some attacks are sophisticated and
launched as a series of different types of at-
tacks. Categorizing attacks through OSNs is
challenging due to similarities between the
ways those attacks are designed and dam-
ages caused by them. This also aggravates
developing a systematic approach of dealing
with these attacks. We start with explain-
ing an OSN in a basic terminology and then
categorize attacks. We believe this way of
categorizing attacks helps forensics analysts
analyze attacks and solve cases.
Attacks benefit from the information
available on or extracted from OSNs, and
use the services of OSNs. As discussed
earlier, an OSN is a graph of vertices and
edges where vertices indicate users and edges
usually indicate relationships between users.
Attackers may try to manipulate users by
creating fake user identities and relation-
ships between users. Each OSN user has
her or his own social profile which could be
visible partially, fully or not visible at all.
Attackers may try to extract unavailable in-
formation about a user profile by analzy-
ing other attributes of the user, messages
of the user, neighbors of the user, and the
user profile on other OSNs. OSN users may
post or share messages in this network. It
should be noted that the content of OSNs
is also visible to non-members of OSNs at
a level. Messages posted by attackers may
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contain fake information or illegal content
and may not only influence registered OSN
users but also passive users of the OSN. OSN
service providers provide APIs to increase
the usability of their services and publicize
anonymized network structure. These APIs
or services could also be used by attackers
to launch their attacks. Search tools pro-
vided by OSNs to find users or search mes-
sages may also help attackers target specific
population in OSNs and build malicious re-
lationships between OSN users.
Our categorization of social network at-
tacks is based on the OSN structure and in-
formation conveyed through OSN networks.
After surveying literature on attacks through
OSNs, we believe that the attacks should be
organized into four levels for an effective and
methodical analysis of these attacks:
1. crime or criminal activity,
2. type of attack,
3. scheme of attack, and
4. attack components.
These four levels of attacks are usually
mixed in the literature and all labeled as at-
tacks. This makes the analysis of attacks
complicated; hence the forensics analysis.
Crime or Criminal Activity. This
level typically involves the outcome of an
attack. Identity-theft, physical threat, bur-
glary, and child pornography are examples
of crimes where online social networks could
be used.
Types of Attacks. There are two types
of attacks that could result in a criminal ac-
tivity based on the goal of an attack:
1. information disclosure attack and
2. opinion/emotion influence attack.
In information disclosure attack, the at-
tacker aims to collect personal informa-
tion about the victim, whereas in opin-
ion/emotion influence attack the attacker
tries to influence the user’s opinion or emo-
tion about a person, a product, or an event
to act in a specific manner. Information dis-
closure attacks includes both real-world and
cyber-space attacks such as profile-squatting
and reputation slander using identity theft,
phishing, personalized spamming, stalking,
bullying, and corporate espionage (ENISA,
2007). In these attacks, attackers may tar-
get a specific part of the population based on
age and sex. Especially, children are likely
to be victims of such attacks. It is pos-
sible that opinion/emotion influence attack
can take place after information disclosure
attack. Opinion/emotion influence attacks
could be performed by spreading messages
to targeted or untargeted nodes in the net-
work.
Schemes of Attacks. Schemes of at-
tacks correspond to ways of launching vari-
ous types of attacks with the purpose of in-
formation disclosure or opinion/emotion in-
fluence which could lead to a criminal ac-
tivity. We categorize schemes of attacks
as social engineering (e.g., spam, phish-
ing) and information discovery (e.g., de-
anonymization).
Attack Components. The schemes of
attacks utilize four attack components:
1. fake nodes/identities,
2. fake relationships,
3. inappropriate/fake messages/posts, and
4. data crawling.
The attackers may utilize the functional-
ities of OSNs to create fake identities and
build fake relationships with honest users.
Fake messages/posts involve publishing or
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uploading false information on OSNs. How-
ever, inappropriate content of a post may
also be problematic and considered as a
crime (e.g., sexual assault streaming (Van
Der Galien, 2017b,a; Moroney et al., 2016)).
Data crawling techniques may involve ana-
lyzing the profile of a user in a single or
multiple OSNs, checking relationships with
other users, and analyzing posted messages
to collect information about the user. Social
engineering scheme is likely to create fake
nodes, relationships and messages, whereas
information discovery scheme may extract
information without creating fake nodes and
relationships.
Fake identity attack component is used
in identity-cloning attacks. In other words,
identity clone attack is actually a scheme
of attack that utilizes fake nodes. Informa-
tion disclosure attacks may be performed by
creating fake identities and relationships in
the network. For example, direct or indirect
information available regarding whereabouts
of a person (e.g., classes taken by a student)
may help stalkers to determine where the at-
tacker is using data crawling attack compo-
nent leading to information disclosure attack
(Gross & Acquisti, 2005). If a person is away
from home and posts messages from a va-
cation spot, such information gives hint for
burglars.
We suggest analyzing criminal activities
by asking the following questions:
1. Is the crime result of information disclo-
sure attack, opinion/emotion influence
attack or both?
2. What type of scheme is used to launch
such attack?
3. Which attack components are used for
developing the scheme of attack?
We believe that once these questions are
answered effectively, forensics analysis could
be performed adequately.
We organize the rest of this section as
follows. We firstly cover social engineering
scheme and then explain information discov-
ery scheme. We have dedicated a special sec-
tion for children-oriented attacks. The cat-
egories and sub-categories of papers studied
in the following sections are provided in Ta-
ble 3.
3.2 Social Engineering Scheme
Social engineering scheme is a critical type
of attack as the attacker manipulates the
victim to provide the information to the
attacker or to act in a specific manner.
Social engineering scheme could be used
for both information disclosure and opin-
ion/emotion influence attacks. Social en-
gineering scheme may utilize fake nodes,
fake relationships, and fake messages. After
providing general social engineering attacks,
we briefly look into fake identity/messaging,
and spam/malware/social bot attacks.
3.2.1 General Social Engineering
Attacks
Social engineering attacks are categorized
into phishing, dumpster diving (attack us-
ing discarded items), shoulder surfing (in-
formation obtained by viewing over some-
one’s shoulder), reverse social engineering
(attacks where victims are lured to con-
tact attackers), waterholing (setting a trap
for the victim to visit a compromised web
site), advanced persistent threat (usually
internet-based espionage attacks), and bait-
ing (malware infected storage medium to be
found by victims) (Krombholz et al., 2015).
Such attacks have been successful in com-
promising Google’s internal system in 2009
(Zetter, 2010), breaking the RSA security to-
ken system in 2011 (RSA, 2011), compromis-
ing Facebook in 2013 (Schwartz, 2013), ob-
taining NY Times employees credentials in
2013 (Perlroth, 2013), and obtaining Pay-
pal’s credit card numbers using phishing
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Table 3. Overview of studies on social attacks and protection
Paper Category Sub-category
Irani, Balduzzi, et al. (2011) social engineering reverse social engineering
Huber, Mulazzani, Weippl, et al. (2011) social engineering fake messaging&insecure communication
Goga et al. (2015) social engineering identity cloning
Jin et al. (2011) social engineering identity cloning
Bilge et al. (2009) social engineering profile cloning
Garg & Nilizadeh (2013) social engineering spam
Brown et al. (2008) social engineering spam
Misener (2011) social engineering social bot
W. Xu et al. (2010) social engineering malware
Heymann et al. (2007) social engineering spam
Viswanath et al. (2014) social engineering fake identity
Guillory & Hancock (2016) social engineering deception
Squicciarini & Griffin (2014) social engineering deception
Griffin & Squicciarini (2012) social engineering deception
Alowibdi et al. (2014) social engineering deception
Yan et al. (2011) social engineering malware
Wagner et al. (2012) social engineering social bots
Nash et al. (2013) social engineering information diffusion
Myers et al. (2012) social engineering information diffusion
Weng et al. (2013) social engineering information diffusion
Dong et al. (2011) social engineering fake relationships
(Backstrom et al., 2007) information discovery de-anonymization
Wondracek et al. (2010) information discovery de-anonymization
Ding et al. (2010) information discovery de-anonymization
Nilizadeh et al. (2014) information discovery de-anonymization
Narayanan & Shmatikov (2009) information discovery de-anonymization
Sweeney (2002) information discovery neighborhood
Chester & Srivastava (2011) information discovery neighborhood
Dey et al. (2012) information discovery attribute disclosure
M. Li et al. (2014) information discovery location disclosure
Irani, Webb, et al. (2011) information discovery identity disclosure (multiple OSNs)
Z. Yang et al. (2014) information discovery sybil
Seigfried-Spellar et al. (2012) children-oriented child pornography (laws)
Wolak et al. (2010) children-oriented online predators
Seigfried-Spellar (2013) children-oriented child pornography
Huitsing et al. (2012) children-oriented bullying
Vermande et al. (2000) children-oriented bullying
Murphy (2012) children-oriented children (detecting)
Penna et al. (2010) children-oriented online gaming
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emails (SocialEngineer, n.d.). Viral mar-
keting attacks may also use social engineer-
ing scheme and come in the form of spams,
phishing and account attacks. Since signif-
icant information is available on online so-
cial networks, phishing attacks are four times
likely to be successful if it appears to be com-
ing from a known person rather than an un-
known person (Jagatic et al., 2007). Design-
ing attacks through fake messages and re-
lationships increases the success of such at-
tacks.
While in traditional social engineering, an
attacker may directly communicate with the
victim, in Reverse Social Engineering (RSE),
the victims are tricked into contacting the
attackers (Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011).
Irani, Balduzzi, et al. (2011) categorize re-
verse social attacks into recommender-based,
demographics-based, and visitor tracking-
based attacks. In recommender-based RSE,
the goal of the attacker is to influence the
recommender of the online social network to
be a possible candidate (friend) for the vic-
tim. In demographics-based RSE, the at-
tacker creates a fake profile for establishing
friendships based on profile similarities (e.g.,
dating sites). In visitor tracking-based RSE,
the attacker visits the profile of the victim.
When the OSN displays information about
who has visited the victim’s profile, the vic-
tim may visit the attacker’s profile and con-
tact the attacker.
Social engineering attacks can also be cat-
egorized as targeted and untargeted (Irani,
Balduzzi, et al., 2011). In a targeted at-
tack, the attacker has a specific user as a
victim whereas in an untargeted attack the
attacker tries to reach as many users as pos-
sible. Moreover, attacks can also be cate-
gorized as direct and mediated (Irani, Bal-
duzzi, et al., 2011). In direct attacks, the at-
tacker may post messages where the victim
can see directly. In mediated attacks, the at-
tacker uses an intermediate agent to bait the
user to himself or herself. Irani, Balduzzi, et
al. (2011) analyzed possible victims by creat-
ing fake profiles. For example, an attractive
female photo on a profile is a bait for young
people for seeking relationships.
To analyze social engineering attacks, the
entities (e.g., environment, attacker, trick
and victim) need to be identified and their
roles should be investigated (Algarni et al.,
2013). Algarni et al. (2013) examine so-
cial engineering threats on social network-
ing sites and inquire the questions of “which
entities exist and how do they effect social
engineering in social networking sites?” It is
concluded in their study that the success of
social engineering attacks is affected by the
characteristics of four main entities: the on-
line social network (the environment), the
social engineer (the attacker), the plan and
technique (the trick), and the online social
network user (the victim).
3.2.2 Fake Identity and Messaging
Scheme
It is possible for attackers to create fake iden-
tities and messages in OSNs. Fake identity
could be used for both information disclo-
sure and opinion/emotion influence, whereas
fake messages are typically used for opin-
ion/emotion influence. Fake identity attacks
create unreal fake nodes and enhance the at-
tack with fake relationships. When attack-
ers want to influence other users by posting
false content, they use fake messaging attack
component. Some attack schemes could be
directly based on attack components.
Deception through providing partially in-
correct information in profiles is a special
type of fake identity scheme. As DePaulo
et al. (1996) describes, deception is a fact of
the life. Deception is an act with an intent
to mislead others without getting noticed by
them, and deception became especially crit-
ical when examining social media services in
which the borders between victims and de-
c© 2016 ADFSL Page 79
JDFSL V11N4 A Survey of Social Network Forensics
ceiving others are mostly hazy (Alowibdi et
al., 2014). Users may provide partially true
information as well as false data about them-
selves. Some users may lie about their criti-
cal attributes such as gender, age (Alowibdi
et al., 2014). Attackers may utilize specific
attributes to establish their attacks. One of
the major challenges for deception analysis is
determining the actual motivation of decep-
tion and separating unintentional incorrect
information from intentional false informa-
tion to get benefit from other users. When
information provided by OSN users is not
true, it is important to determine the rea-
sons for false information. Users may pro-
vide false information since personal infor-
mation could be accessible by undesired peo-
ple. Another reason is that users would like
to have good social images. The most critical
false information representation is deceiving
others to get unfair benefits or abuse oth-
ers. Such detection of deception is critical
for forensics analysts.
Fake Messaging. Spread of fake news
through online social networks caused a man
to set fire at a restaurant which he thought
that it was a center of child-sex traffick-
ing (Kang & Goldman, 2016). Google and
Facebook have started to take steps to deal
with fake news since the end of 2016 (Wak-
abayashi & Isaac, 2017), and only time will
tell whether if it will be a success. Validating
truth of messages is a very complicated issue.
At least, OSN service providers may put ef-
fort in labeling messages related to crimes.
Human interactions may also influence
how messages are spread in OSNs. Weng
et al. (2013) analyze the Yahoo! Meme
dataset between 2009 and 2010, where
they try to observe different strategies
that users adopt for interacting with oth-
ers. The authors characterize users and
use different parameters which are approx-
imated by Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) (Cowan, 1998). Triadic closure was
considered as the major preferred method for
forming connections among users. Triadic
closure is used when user A follows user B
and user B follows user C. Overtime, it is
observed that user A follows user C as he or
she keeps observing messages from user C.
In their paper, the authors observed that, in
the early stages, triadic closure is very dom-
inant. However, in later stages, it was ob-
served that information diffusion in the net-
work plays a major role in causing people to
interact with each other.
It is important to analyze how informa-
tion is spread in OSNs to deal with fake mes-
sage diffusion. Myers et al. (2012) present a
model where users can reach information ei-
ther through social network links or through
external sources. Then, their model is ap-
plied to URL emergence in Twitter network
and evaluated over one month of traces from
Twitter. The authors analyze the effect of
external sources over information diffusion
among people. It is observed that 71% of
the information in Twitter is caused by in-
formation diffusion, whereas the rest of the
information comes from external sources.
OSN providers should provide additional
control mechanisms for checking the au-
thenticity of messages. Huber, Mulazzani,
Weippl, et al. (2011) devised friend-in-the-
middle (FITM) attack (when privacy set-
tings are at high levels to avoid spams) by
basing their attack on insecure communi-
cation between the user and OSN. They
have developed friend injection to become
a member of a target network, application
injection to obtain profile content, and so-
cial engineering to exploit gathered informa-
tion. They highly recommend that OSN ser-
vice providers use HTTPS instead of HTTP
for all communication exchanges to thwart
FITM attacks.
Identity Cloning. Impersonation which
is a type of identity cloning attack disrupts
the trust among OSN users. Identity cloning
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attacks can be categorized into celebrity im-
personation attacks, social engineering at-
tacks, and doppleganger bot attacks (Goga
et al., 2015). In celebrity impersonation at-
tack, the attacker imitates the profile of a fa-
mous person by attaining his/her followers.
In social engineering attack, the attacker ex-
ploits victim’s friends to obtain sensitive in-
formation about the victim. The doppel-
ganger bot attack is impersonation of an or-
dinary person and likely to be used to in-
fluence other users by providing reviews or
other information. Since the profile is realis-
tic, it is not detectable by sybil or spam de-
fenders. They analyze profile similarity, so-
cial neighborhood overlap, time overlap be-
tween accounts, and differences between ac-
counts to detect impersonating accounts us-
ing support vector machines (SVM) classi-
fier.
Attackers developed enhanced methods of
identity cloning by carefully setting privacy
attributes. Jin et al. (2011) propose detec-
tion of faked identities based on attribute
similarity in profiles and similarity of friend
networks. When attacker creates a fake iden-
tity, the attacker may not only duplicate ac-
tual victim data but may also benefit from
privacy settings. For example, a fake pro-
file may keep the birth date and college as
private while the victim profile keep them as
public which makes the fake identity more
realistic. Moreover, their method also con-
siders the possibility of attacker trying to
add a subset of actual friends of the victim,
recommended list of friends, excluded set of
friends, or combination of these. They apply
a number of similarity measures on profiles
and friend networks for detecting fake iden-
tities. However, the validation is not an easy
task.
Identity cloning attacks could also be cate-
gorized whether identity cloning is based on
the same OSN or multiple OSNs. Bilge et
al. (2009) categorize attacks from identity
cloning attacks as same-site profile cloning
and cross-site profile cloning attacks. In
same-site cloning, an attacker duplicates the
profile of a user and sends messages to be-
come friends with that user’s friends in the
same OSN. In cross-site profile attacks, an
attacker creates a profile of the victim in an-
other OSN where the victim is not registered
yet, and the attacker sends messages to be-
come friends with the victim’s friends.
Profile Deception. There are various
forms of deceptions. While Turner et al.
(1975) categorize deception into lies, exag-
gerations, half-truths, secrets, and diversion-
ary responses, Utz (2005) takes another ap-
proach in computer-mediated communica-
tion and categorizes deception into category
deception (gender switching), attractiveness
deception, or identity concealment. Since
true identity of social media users may not
be known, it is possible that innocent peo-
ple may be deceived or abused through mis-
behavior of deceptive users. Predicting at-
tributes of social media users may help to
protect regular users as well as identify per-
petrators.
As social networking sites provide more
convenient ways of communications and rela-
tionships,they also make the deception eas-
ier. Walther (1996) points out that people
take advantage of computer-mediated com-
munication environments to enhance their
self-presentation and inflate other people’s
view about themselves. In addition, Buller
& Burgoon (1996) propose Interpersonal De-
ception Theory, which defines deception as
an intentional act in which senders know-
ingly transmit messages that aim to foster
a false belief or interpretation by the re-
ceiver. On the other hand, according to some
other researchers, deception is not always in-
tentional (e.g., self-deception) (Gardner &
Martinko, 1988), (Jones et al., 1962), (A. Li
& Bagger, 2006). Regardless of the decep-
tion type, successful forensics investigation
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requires detection of deception.
Guillory & Hancock (2016) study how
people use deception to enhance self-
presentation. In their experiment, they in-
vestigate how users’ social connections affect
the way they use deception in their resume
profiles. For instance, people feel more com-
fortable to lie in an environment where oth-
ers do not know them. However, it is less
likely for people to lie in an environment
where they have several friends due to the
fear of being caught. Moreover, the authors
also predict that the users would be reluctant
to lie about objective information such as ed-
ucation or work places for enhancing their
self-presentation since such objective infor-
mation could be verified as either truthful
or deceptive by their network connections.
On the other hand, subjective information
such as interests, hobbies, etc. is more diffi-
cult to be verified as deceptive. Thus, people
would lie more about such subjective infor-
mation. They have setup experiments where
undergraduate students are split into three
groups to create their resumes for a con-
sultant position. First group was asked to
create their resumes in an MS Word docu-
ment. Second group was asked to create a
completely private resume on LinkedIn that
only user and researchers could access. The
third group was asked to create a public
LinkedIn resume. Just after all the resumes
were created, the researchers revealed the ac-
tual purpose of the study. The students then
were asked to identify all lies on the resumes
and asked to provide the truthful version of
them. The results of this work show that the
number of lies that students told did not dif-
fer among those three groups. On the other
hand, the type of lies differed among the
three groups. The students in the first group
tend to lie more about objective information,
e.g., responsibilities, than the students in the
second group. On the other hand, the stu-
dents in the third group lied more about sub-
jective information (interests, hobbies). This
study shows that forensics investigators need
to develop methods or search tools to ver-
ify subjective information. This may eventu-
ally help them detect criminals/perpetrators
who commit crimes via lies.
Identifying cases when online users are
likely to deceive or provide false information
may help to determine credibility of informa-
tion. Squicciarini & Griffin (2014) investi-
gate the problem of deception in online sites
by analyzing the posts of a forum to deter-
mine why and how honest users engage in
deceptive activities. A game theoretic ap-
proach was proposed to understand users’
behaviors based on three cases: (i) peer pres-
sure, (ii) a potential reward, and (iii) com-
fort level. It is shown that users will play a
coordination game to minimize social stress
by choosing a level of deception. Prior to
examination of forum posts, they conducted
an online survey on undergraduate students
who have many social network interactions.
The purpose was to get an insight on when,
how and why users deceive. It was asked
whether they would withhold information,
tell the truth, or lie about their age, job,
GPA, location, phone, etc. The results of
the survey show that users’ tendency to de-
ceive for data types is not mainly for privacy
concerns, but it is highly correlated with the
desire to portray a successful social image.
Furthermore, it is shown that lying in so-
cial networks and withholding information
are two different actions. In addition, it is
shown that deceit actions are influenced by
inner-circle users. In the analysis of the fo-
rum posts, 3.7M posts of 21K users were fil-
tered down to 1,400 users who had at least
one infraction. 356 users had at least 2 in-
fractions. The infractions are identified by
the website and other users’ comments about
the user’s activities. One of the conclusions
of their research is that deceptive users are
not only hard to identify but they are also
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influential and affect other users to do decep-
tive actions. Based on this study, it can also
be argued that criminals may affect other
people with or without criminal inclination
to commit crimes. Therefore, similar study
may also be adapted to search for such pro-
motive users.
Social sites request certain information to
be provided by their users upon the regis-
tration process. Users usually try to mini-
mize the amount of information they provide
which they think might reduce their identifi-
cation on the internet. This however, raises
security and privacy issues. Griffin & Squic-
ciarini (2012) develop a deception model
which uses game theory to detect users’ will-
ingness to release, withhold or lie about their
information. In their work, a preliminary
model of deception is designed using a game
theory. In this model, it is intended to show
the complexity of information revelation in
OSNs. Misrepresentation in three cases are
also examined. These cases are truthful in-
formation disclosure, withholding informa-
tion, and deception. Data was collected from
users through surveys. The information that
was aimed to help users gain (i) privacy
awareness, (ii) attitude toward information
withholding and practices, and (iii) attitude
toward lies and misrepresentation. The ten-
dency of a user to lie seems to be highly cor-
related with users’ desire to show a good so-
cial image as discussed above (Squicciarini &
Griffin, 2014), and the tendency is not very
related to users’ privacy concerns.
3.2.3 Spam, Malware and Social Bot
Attacks
For categorization of users into spammers,
bots, cyborgs, and fake users based on their
behavior, the interested readers may study
the survey by (Tuna et al., 2016). In this
section, we provide a brief overview of how
attacks of such users can be launched as
spams, malware, and bots rather than focus-
ing on user behavior. Spread of fake messag-
ing through information diffusion also helps
success of such attacks.
Spam Attacks. Social engineering at-
tacks can be performed through spams, and
there could be correlation between the net-
work attackers or spammers and financial
and cultural features of a society (Garg &
Nilizadeh, 2013). The main type of at-
tack for spams is opinion/emotion influence.
Social spammers may not only launch at-
tacks to spread ads but may also dissem-
inate pornography, viruses or befriend vic-
tims, steal personal information (Bilge et
al., 2009), and destroy a system’s reputa-
tion (Lee et al., 2010). Fake messages are
the main attack component for spam attacks
and can be strengthened by fake identity and
relationships.
Social engineering attacks through prop-
agating spams on OSNs such as Twitter
and Facebook or through websites such as
Craigslist is very common. Even though
there are some analysis tools and filtering
techniques, in general it is not enough to pre-
vent such spams. Thus, it is crucial to de-
tect the spam messages and spammers. Garg
& Nilizadeh (2013) investigate if financial,
structural and cultural features of a society
explain the actual reasons behind Craigslist-
based crimes across 30 American cities. The
authors focused on cars+trucks category of
Craigslist with two subcategories: by-owner
and by-dealer. Furthermore, flagged adver-
tisements by Craigslist were considered, and
the ads were classified according to the city.
Shapiro-Wilk test (S. S. Shapiro & Wilk,
1965) and null hypothesis techniques sug-
gest that the number of people in the cities
are not related with the number and per-
centage of flagged ads. Also, income per
capita is substantially related with the on-
line scam exposure and it suggests that when
education level and income increase, the per-
centage of exposure to online scams also in-
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creases.
Context-aware spam is defined as a spam
that is highly likely to be clickable due
to authentic social connections (Brown et
al., 2008). They are usually categorized as
relationship-based (using only friendship in-
formation), unshared-attribute (using an at-
tribute from one of the parties in the rela-
tionship), and shared attribute (using a vis-
ible attribute to both parties in the relation-
ship) based attacks. Brown et al. (2008)
show that people with private profiles are
vulnerable to spam as much as other users.
Similar to spams, especially fraud diffu-
sion may economically hurt many people.
Nash et al. (2013) combine social network
analysis and diffusion theory to study a fraud
that spread in British Columbia, Canada,
defrauding 2,285 investors for loss of 240 mil-
lion dollars. The diffusion of fraud is stud-
ied from the point of view of victims who
invested in the fraudulent scheme. Illegal in-
novations are typically studied with respect
to the offenders adopting novel crime tech-
niques, not crime victims. The purpose of
their study is two-fold. First, they assess
whether there is empirical evidence of dif-
fusion in the spread of the fraud. Second,
they examine the nature of the relationship
between victims and the individuals who in-
fluenced them to invest in order to deter-
mine the relative importance of opinion lead-
ers who influenced their friends and fam-
ily into investing, and industry profession-
als and mass media channels in spreading
the fraud. By analyzing the fraud from a
social network perspective, they show how
the fraud diffused through short chains from
multiple anchor points, including victims
who unknowingly became agents of diffu-
sion in their own victimization network. The
data for this study are drawn from a vic-
tim survey of the investment and securities
fraud orchestrated by Eron Mortgage Cor-
poration. To identify the number of friends
and family who nominated specific individ-
uals as a source of influence, they used in-
degree centrality. They have shown that an
illegal innovation spreads through word of
mouth, change agents, opinion leaders, and
network bridges. This study confirms the
importance of applying social network meth-
ods to diffusion research, including diffusion
of criminal innovations in order to take the
technical skills of criminals into account.
Malware and Social Bot Attacks.
Malware attacks may create accounts, join
groups, and post messages on OSNs. Mal-
ware software can be used as an attack us-
ing worms such as Koobface (W. Xu et
al., 2010) and cross-site forgery (Fitzgerald,
2009). Malware attacks can post unwanted
messages on the walls of users. Fake messag-
ing is the main tool for such attacks. Simi-
larly, fake identity and relationships may in-
crease the probability of being prone to mal-
ware attacks. Social bots may attack OSN
users to spread information or to influence
opinions of users (Misener, 2011).
3.3 Information Discovery
Scheme
In information discovery scheme, the ma-
jor goal is to identify users using the net-
work structure and available information
from user profiles. Information discovery
scheme is suitable for information disclosure
attacks and could be used for identity-theft
purposes. OSN users may not be aware
how much information could be revealed by
just sharing a small amount of information.
For example, it is possible to identify demo-
graphics information, face photo identifica-
tion, or social security number for identity
theft purposes (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). 5-
digit ZIP code, gender, and date of birth
information together is satisfactory to iden-
tify around 87% of the U.S. population using
1990 U.S. census data (Sweeney, L., 2000),
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whereas this percentage has gone down to
63% for 2000 U.S. census (Golle, 2006),
which is still quite high. Data crawling-
based attacks may use information from a
single OSN or multiple OSNs and may tar-
get specific attributes of victims.
The information discovery scheme may
use the available information from OSNs
or may create fake nodes and relationships
to reveal the identities in a network. We
briefly discuss de-anonymization, neighbor-
hood, and attribute closure in this section
under information discovery scheme.
3.3.1 De-anonymization using
Network Structure and
Similarity
Attacks to reveal the privacy of users by
identifying their connections are categorized
as active and passive attacks (Backstrom et
al., 2007). In an active attack, the attacker
creates a number of accounts and a subnet-
work and tries to communicate with users.
When this small network becomes the tar-
get network, the locations of victim users
can be identified by using the connections
in that network. In passive attack, the at-
tacker forms a coalition with a number of
users and use their neighborhood informa-
tion to compromise the privacy of users in
their network. Wondracek et al. (2010) use
(browser) history stealing to identify group
memberships and show that group member-
ships are satisfactory to uniquely identify or
de-anonymize an individual.
De-anonymization attack can also be cat-
egorized into mapping-based and guessing
based approaches (Ding et al., 2010). While
mapping-based approaches use the back-
ground knowledge of known users with their
IDs to map vertices in released anonymized
data, guessing methods may target a user
in released data to determine one or more
of known users by matching released data
against known users. Nilizadeh et al. (2014)
show that existing de-anonymization meth-
ods can be enhanced by first dividing the
network into communities, mapping com-
munities, enriching seeds within commu-
nities, and global propagation by map-
ping remaining nodes. Their divide-and-
conquer method is able to map 40% of
nodes for Twitter dataset of 90K nodes
with 20% edge noise and 16 seeds whereas
the base Narayanan-Shimatikov technique
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009) could al-
most not map any.
Sybil attacks are an example of attacks
that could be used as a social engineer-
ing scheme as well as information discov-
ery scheme. In sybil attacks, the attacker
may launch accounts (from as small as seven
to thousands depending on the purpose)
for de-anonymization (information disclo-
sure) or manipulating voting results (opin-
ion/emotion influence) (Gao et al., 2011).
Z. Yang et al. (2014) found that 80% of sybil
nodes do not necessarily form its own net-
work and they just try to build relationships
with normal users. Their analysis shows that
edges between sybil nodes are formed unin-
tentionally by the time. They also found out
that sybil nodes without explicit social ties
may act together to spread spam.
3.3.2 Neighborhood Attacks
Neighborhood attack is a way of re-
identification of a victim by obtaining some
information about the neighbors of a vic-
tim using anonymized networks which are
expected to preserve the privacy of users. In
the k-anonymity model, it is expected that
an individual cannot be identified with a
probability more than 1/k in an anonymized
network (Sweeney, 2002). Sweeney (2002)
proposes a neighborhood extraction and cod-
ing method to satisfy k-anonymity with
small anonymization cost by changing labels
and adding edges.
While most of the studies are done to pre-
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vent the attacks on identifying user, ana-
lyzing attribute disclosure attack that tar-
gets sensitive information has also been
needed. Chester & Srivastava (2011) pro-
vide α-proximity measure to capture the sus-
ceptibility of a network for attribute disclo-
sure attack. The social network is considered
as an undirected, simple, and vertex-labeled
graph.α-proximity measure is defined based
on the label distribution of vertices in the
graph. An algorithm is designed to make
the graph α-proximal that converts a vertex-
labeled graph G into an α-proximal graph
with a number of additional edges. Basi-
cally, their main goal is to make sure that
by gaining an access to a specific part of the
network an attacker should not be able to
predict sensitive information. For example,
assume that network nodes are labeled with
respect to having some disease or not. If
there are sub-graphs having mostly diseases,
it will be easy to predict that members of
that neighborhood have disease if there is an
access to that neighborhood in the graph. To
make sure that attackers cannot predict that
type of sensitive information, the label dis-
tribution of a neighborhood in a graph with
labeled nodes should be similar to the entire
graph.
Some information from user or neighbor
profiles could indirectly identify specific at-
tributes of OSN users. Dey et al. (2012)
show that it is possible to estimate the age
of users on Facebook by analyzing friend’s
ages, ages of friends of friends, and so on.
They show it is possible to estimate ages
with an error of a few years for highly private
users who do not share friend list in public.
Using high school graduation years of users
and their friends reveal helpful information
about the birth years of users.
3.3.3 Attribute Disclosure Attacks
Some attributes can be predicted based on
the interactions and services provided by
OSNs. Location-based social networks that
help to find friends with spatial proximity
have other types of vulnerabilities and the
most important of them is that the loca-
tion of users can be revealed. M. Li et al.
(2014) show that using 30 volunteers and 3-
week data, their attack method can detect
top 5 locations of a user with high accuracy.
The attacker may generate 3 fake anchor
locations and applies iterative trilateration
method using distances to three locations.
The attacker further applies space partition
to increase its accuracy.
Since users may have accounts on multiple
OSNs, information available (or social foot-
print) from multiple OSNs may reveal the
identity and attributes of a person. Irani,
Webb, et al. (2011) show that while physical
identification can be successful around 34%
using information from a single social net-
work, the physical identification attack may
be successful around 90% when information
from six or more profiles is used. They
also state that the similar success percent-
ages are obtained for password-recovery at-
tacks. Narayanan & Shmatikov (2009) show
that it is possible to de-anonymize thousands
of users by using information from multi-
ple OSNs which users have registered. They
show that users who are verified to have ac-
counts on both Flickr and Twitter can be
identified with 12% error rate by just ana-
lyzing the network structure without creat-
ing dummy sybil nodes.
3.4 Children-Oriented Attacks
Children may be victims in social networks
or online games. Child abuse and child
pornography (CP) is one of the major crimes
today, and the online communication does
not necessarily protect minors. It is use-
ful to recall the development of CP laws
in the US and in the world (Seigfried-
Spellar et al., 2012). After that, we present
threats for children by briefly looking at
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profiles of online predators (Wolak et al.,
2010; Seigfried-Spellar, 2013), cyberbullying
(Huitsing et al., 2012), detecting children
(Murphy, 2012), and risk of online games
(Penna et al., 2010).
3.4.1 Legal Aspects
Seigfried-Spellar et al. (2012) review the de-
velopment of child pornography (CP) laws
and criminalizing by US constitutions and
report the issues of the laws as well as the
techniques to block such uses and distribu-
tions. Since 1950s obscene pornographic ma-
terials were accepted illegal by the courts in
the USA. And CP is an obscene expression
of speech and is not protected by the First
Amendment. In 1970s, the congress declared
that CP is shifted from “cottage” to “orga-
nized abuse.” Child Protection Act 1984 con-
sidered CP as “lascivious” and illegal when
it focuses on the clothed genital region of
children despite the lack of nudity. In 1990,
some courts decided that private possession
of CP is also illegal- not sharing does not
make it legal. In 1996, virtual images of chil-
dren are also considered as CP. CP currently
carries maximum 30 years with minimum 15
years of imprisonment. Internet providers
who do not willingly report CP incidents are
fined $50K for the first time and $100K for
subsequent incidents. They are responsible
for reporting to NCMEC (National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children). The
European Union involves 27 countries that
prohibit the CP, and there is an argument on
whether filtering the sites by tools or remov-
ing the whole websites is the right solution.
3.4.2 Threats for Children
The harm after using online activities is cat-
egorized as harm from content (disseminat-
ing pornographic or harmful content about
the child), harm by contact (the child tar-
geted for participating in sexual abuse, be-
ing photographed, and disseminated), and
harm by conduct (uploading harmful ma-
terial or physically meeting with an adult)
by (UNICEF Office of Research, 2011).
These threats for children may involve online
predators, risky behavior, and cyberbullying
(Fire, Kagan, et al., 2014).
Online Predators. While identifying
criminals for OSN-initiated crimes, it should
be noted that these criminals do not neces-
sarily use fake identities such as represent-
ing themselves as children. Wolak et al.
(2010) analyzed internet-initiated sex crimes
and found out that the victims who were
teenagers aged 13 to 17 knew that they
were communicating with an adult, could
lead to a physical meeting and engage in
a sexual activity. Hence, internet-initiated
sex crimes are not necessarily a result of
online deceptive information. In another
study, Seigfried-Spellar (2013) reports some
statistics from previous studies on different
preferences of child pornography consumers,
and investigates measuring the preference of
these consumers. Previous statistics by In-
ternet Watch Foundation reports that 69%
of child victims are under 10 years old, 24%
are under 6 years old, and 4% are under 2
years old. Canadian center for child pro-
tection examined about 35K websites. Over
half of the images were from under 8 years
old. 68.9% of them were sadistic and 83%
included females. A survey question was
created, and volunteers (CP users) from so-
cial networks and websites were invited to
rate their content preference on child porno-
graphic images: toddler, poses, violence,
etc. Respondents rated their opinions as (i)
strongly do not prefer, (ii) do not prefer, (iii)
indifferent, (iv) prefer, and (v) strongly pre-
fer. The collected survey data was limited to
2 individuals, which cannot provide statisti-
cally significant conclusions. However, there
were notable descriptive differences in the
types of images preferred by these CP users.
In general, one of the respondents appeared
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to prefer pornographic images of teens, re-
gardless of whether the child was posing in
a nonsexual or sexually provocative manner,
while the other one preferred a wider-range
of sexually explicit image content.
Cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is not
rare, as an online survey shows that 12% of
parents state that their kids are exposed to
cyberbullying based on data from 24 coun-
tries (Ipsos, 2012). Unfortunately, cyber-
bullying may result in committing suicide
(Dean, 2012; Pearce, 2013). The use of on-
line social networks at K-12 schools may be
analyzed to understand and prevent psycho-
logical attacks such as bullying. Huitsing
et al. (2012) examine whether the associa-
tion between victimization and psychologi-
cal adjustment is moderated by the class-
room network position of bullies and vic-
tims. They test the effects of the social
structure of bullying and victimization net-
works to see how it is correlated with two
psychological adjustment variables: depres-
sion and self-esteem. In order to assess the
structure of these networks, they use mea-
sures of centralization. Degree centraliza-
tion is used to measure the importance of
a student in the network. If the centraliza-
tion of a classroom is high, then it is more
likely that only a few students are central.
The authors first examined how victims be-
have if bullying is common in that classroom.
If the victimization is not a common event,
then the victims tend to blame themselves.
They collected the data via internet-based
questionnaires from 78 Finland schools, in-
volving 429 classrooms and a total of 8248
students in grades 3-5 (mean ages in 10-
12). They measured depression and self-
esteem of the students by asking them ques-
tions. Participants responded on a 5-point
Likert-type scale. They used victimization,
sex, and age as the independent variables
describing the students. As for the inde-
pendent variables describing the classrooms,
they used classroom averages of victimiza-
tion and bullying. In order to collect this
data, they used peer nominations. To calcu-
late the classroom centralization of victim-
ization and bullying, they used the normal-
ized degree variance. The degree variance
is used to measure the heterogeneity of stu-
dents. Analyses showed that boys were re-
ported to be somewhat more victimized than
girls, whereas girls were somewhat more de-
pressed than boys. No sex differences were
found for self-esteem or age. It was also
found that boys and younger children were
less depressed than girls and older children.
Vermande et al. (2000) also show that such
central social network structures of class-
room are typical bullying and victimization
networks. They examine the dispersal of
bullying and victimization in classrooms by
examining the centralization of victimization
and bullying in the classroom.
Detecting Children by Images.
Available images in profiles may help online
predators detect children. Murphy (2012)
shows that humans can predict the ages of
children and distinguish the juvenile and
adults; and it is not just common sense
but it is decided by preconscious condition
of human experience on estimating on the
facial features and proportions. Studies
show that people can estimate ages of
subjects which are in 20-54 with 2.39 years
deviation. Old faces age slower than young
faces. Thus, estimating ages of old people is
more error-prone. In other words, predicting
a young person’s age is easier than of an old
one (e.g., 5 years old will not be guessed as
15 years old, but 35 years old person could
be guessed as 45). In this study, several
surveys were deployed. The first part of the
survey had some images from websites and
the task was to identify whether the image
belonged to an adult or a kid. At least
90% of respondents predicted correctly. In
the second part users had to order (sort)
Page 88 c© 2016 ADFSL
A Survey of Social Network Forensics JDFSL V11N4
the photos of a person when the person
was between 6 years and 16 years old. For
two sets of photos, the accuracy is between
74% and 99% for 167 respondents. The
respondents commented that they used the
size of shoulders and proportion of facial
features to decide. Another survey was
completed by 107 people and the goal was
to estimate the ages of 47 subjects whose
ages were between 0 and 25. Survey re-
spondents were quite accurate on predicting
the ages. However, the prediction accuracy
decreased while reaching the adolescence
and it increased again after adulthood.
Majority of estimations for under age of
18 was higher than the real age, which
implies that if the criminal examiner has a
reasonable doubt that the image may not
be under age, then the image should not be
considered for criminal charges.
Risk of Online Gaming Networks.
Protection of children is very important as
they are usually interested in playing online
games with people who may portray them-
selves as someone else. Penna et al. (2010)
present an approach about safety for chil-
dren who are playing online games. Their
approach proposes to monitor and detect re-
lationships forming with a child in online
games. If an oﬄine meeting has been ar-
ranged with the child or it has the poten-
tial to occur, system will give an alert ac-
cording to relationship. The system was in-
stalled on the child’s computer with the local
Windows account name provided by parents.
Communications and event data were stored
in a database. Some indicators and tokens
of physical locations or meetings being ar-
ranged were searched on the stored data. If
messages were detected as suspicious, then
system gave alert to the parents via email or
other report output. Test data was collected
from the researchers’ personal game play ex-
perience (World of Warcraft: WOW) and
online communications (1,191 hours over 3.5
years). The prototype database included
118,230 chat messages and 922 aliases. Real
data was used to assist in the creation of
the framework including strings, rules, and
regular expressions. In their experiments,
the prototype successfully achieved its objec-
tives by outputting suspicious scenarios and
highlighting them with high ranks.
3.5 Summary
There are many types of OSN-initiated at-
tacks covered in the literature. Categoriza-
tion of attacks in the literature focuses on
the similarity of attacks and damages. Such
categorization methods have limitations for
forensics analysts since these methods do not
help forensic analysts develop a systematic
way of solving cases. We have proposed cat-
egorization of attacks into four levels: crime
or criminal attacks, type of attack, scheme
of attack, and attack components. Our cat-
egorization helps to separate crimes which
could be outcome of information disclosure
or opinion/emotion influence and could be
launched using social engineering and infor-
mation discovery schemes. These schemes
utilize fake nodes, fake relationships, in-
appropriate/fake messages/posts, and data
crawling.
Forensics analysts should be aware of the
fact that attackers can establish various
forms of attacks. Knowing existing attacks
and learning how to prevent damages caused
by these attacks may help law enforcement
personnel take necessary precautions for new
types of attacks. Especially, understanding
children-oriented attacks, developing an ef-
fective legal framework for OSNs, and moni-
toring activities of children will help to pro-
tect minors in our society.
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4. FORENSICS
ANALYSIS AND
DEFENSE METHODS
FOR SOCIAL ATTACKS
Protecting OSN users and identifying crim-
inal activities and criminals are important
for forensics analysts. The defense methods
should make sure that identities, relation-
ships, and messages are authentic. More-
over, users should not reveal private infor-
mation carelessly and OSN service providers
should ascertain that user information is not
revealed by de-anonymization attacks. The
three methods suggested for dealing with
spams by (Heymann et al., 2007) can be gen-
eralized for developing defense methods for
social attacks: prevention, detection, and de-
motion. Prevention methods should guar-
antee that the identities belong to real peo-
ple, relationships among identities are real,
and messages that are posted are verified if
needed. Moreover, OSN service providers
should not allow information leakage and
users should be informed about possible un-
intentional data closure. Detection meth-
ods may allow creation of new identities,
relationships, and posting messages. Once
these entities are created, the detection sys-
tem tries to validate them. The demotion
method may rank identities, relationships,
and messages and assigns a score or rank so
that users can protect themselves. While the
strength and frequency of security measures
such as Captchas may help to deal with some
of the attacks (Bilge et al., 2009), user aware-
ness is critical for dealing with attacks (Gao
et al., 2011) as there is a trade-off employing
security measures and user friendliness.
In order to protect users from social at-
tacks, the security of OSN users should
be improved by privacy preservation tech-
niques. In this section, we categorize privacy
preservation techniques into wrapper-based,
access control, and methods that increase
user awareness. We explain specific methods
that will help forensics analysts identify fake
identities, fake messages, and fake relation-
ships and protect users from malicious users,
messages, and relationships. Finally, we pro-
vide a brief overview of studies on search-
ing traces of OSN data from devices of OSN
users to support forensics investigations.
4.1 Privacy Preservation
Methods
Private information includes personal sensi-
tive information, the relationships of users,
locations that users visit, the location of user
homes, temporal data such as time-of-day,
a specific date, or a special occasion about
users. Attacks based on data crawling meth-
ods may reveal private information about
users. Quantifying, measuring, and evalu-
ating privacy are some of the most difficult
tasks in social networks. Measures for for
determining disclosure of privacy (Y. Wang
& Nepali, 2013) and analysis of the secu-
rity behavior of users (keeping patches up to
date, cautious website visits, making regu-
lar backups, and using anti-virus programs)
are needed. Wash & Rader (2011) used mis-
chief and vandal models for protection, and
crime and burglar models led to prevention
of access control.
Management of sharing private informa-
tion appropriately is not an easy task and
how legal frameworks and OSN service
providers address privacy breaches or im-
proper use of personal data should be stud-
ied. Then, based on the needs, different
types of tools can be implemented to de-
tect and protect users’ privacy. After ana-
lyzing privacy preservation methods in the
literature, we categorize them into three
groups: wrapper-based methods, access-
control methods, and methods that increase
user awareness. Wrapper-based methods ba-
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Table 4. Overview of studies on forensics analysis and defense methods
Paper Category Sub-category
Sayaf et al. (2013) privacy preservation access control
I. Singh et al. (2012) privacy preservation wrapper-based
Baden et al. (2009) privacy preservation wrapper-based
K. Singh et al. (2009) privacy preservation wrapper-based
Yamada et al. (2012) privacy preservation access control
Hu et al. (2013) privacy preservation access control
Paradesi et al. (2012) privacy preservation access control
Burkholder & Greenstadt (2012) privacy preservation user awareness
White et al. (2013) privacy preservation user awareness
Y. Wang & Nepali (2013) privacy preservation user awareness
Z. Chu et al. (2010) fake identity user categorization
Viswanath et al. (2014) fake identity user categorization
Peled et al. (2013) fake identity profile matching
Vosecky et al. (2010) fake identity profile matching
Johansson et al. (2013) fake identity profile matching
Orebaugh & Allnutt (2010) fake identity authorship analysis
Orebaugh et al. (2014) fake identity authorship analysis
Orebaugh et al. (2014) fake identity gender detection
Douceur (2002) fake identity sybil
Yu et al. (2006) fake identity sybil
Yu et al. (2008) fake identity sybil
Cao et al. (2012) fake identity sybil
Wei et al. (2012) fake identity sybil
Alvisi et al. (2013) fake identity sybil
Heymann et al. (2007) fake messaging prevention, detection, demotion
Zubiaga & Ji (2014) fake messaging credibility of messages
Sikdar et al. (2013) fake messaging credibility of messages
Wagner et al. (2013) fake messaging user susceptibility
Yan et al. (2011) fake messaging reaction to infection
Yan et al. (2011) fake messaging network sanitation
Fire, Kagan, et al. (2014) fake relationship scoring friends
Mutawa et al. (2012) data tracing Facebook, Twitter, MySpace
Awan (2015) data tracing Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn
H. Chu et al. (2014) data tracing Facebook, Google Map
Cahyani et al. (2016) data tracing DropBox, Google Drive, OneDrive
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sically use an additional service and the user
utilizes this service while interacting with
the OSN. Access control methods determine
how and who should access the data of OSN
users. Methods that aim to increase user
awareness inform users how much informa-
tion is available about themselves. Next, we
discuss these groups in detail.
4.1.1 Wrapper-based Methods
Most OSNs today provide some form of
privacy controls so that users can protect
their shared content from other users. How-
ever, these controls are typically not suffi-
ciently expressive and/or do not provide fine-
grained protection of information. I. Singh
et al. (2012) introduce a new privacy control-
group messaging on Twitter with users hav-
ing fine-grained control over who can see
their messages. Specifically, they demon-
strate that such a privacy control can be of-
fered to users of Twitter without having to
wait for Twitter to make changes to its sys-
tem. They have designed and implemented
Twitsper, a wrapper around Twitter that en-
ables private group communication among
existing Twitter users while preserving Twit-
ter’s commercial interests. Their design pre-
serves the privacy of group information (i.e.,
who communicates with whom) both from
the Twitsper server as well as from undesired
Twitsper users. Furthermore, their eval-
uation shows that their implementation of
Twitsper imposes minimal server-side band-
width requirements and incurs low client-
side energy consumption.
Persona (Baden et al., 2009) enables users
to choose personal information to be stored
on a decentralized storage system and com-
bines attribute-level encryption with public
key cryptography. Lockr (Tootoonchian et
al., 2009) (i) separates social networking con-
tent from the functionalities of the OSN, (ii)
avoids re-use of social data by the OSN for
unintended purposes by providing digitally
signed social relationships to access social
data, and (iii) enables two strangers with a
common friend to confirm their relationship
using a message encryption based on a so-
cial relationship key without exposing them-
selves to others. FaceCloak (Luo et al., 2009)
is another method that hides private infor-
mation, encrypts it, and stores on a sepa-
rate server while using alternate fake infor-
mation to the OSN while providing access to
only trusted or authorized users of a person.
NOYB (None Of Your Business) (Guha et
al., 2008) is a wrapper for OSNs to support
privacy of users by encrypting user data and
creating ciphertext similar to legitimate data
where only authorized users can decrypt and
decode the data.
There is no guarantee that these wrapper-
based methods do not abuse the information
provided. To benefit the functionalities of
a third party application, a user may grant
access to her personal information regard-
less of the information is actually needed
or used for intended purposes. K. Singh
et al. (2009) developed xBook, a wrapper
around a third party application, that con-
trols whether information is provided to ex-
ternal entities based on the policies or not.
However, it does not check whether informa-
tion is actually needed by the application or
not.
4.1.2 Access Control Methods
The conflicts in OSNs may attract different
types of information leakage. Yamada et al.
(2012) show that friend-list recovery, pro-
file recovery and post recovery attacks are
possible. Typical OSNs apply permit-take-
precedence meaning that grant authoriza-
tions have higher priority than denial rather
than denial-take-precedence where denial of
access has higher priority than grant ac-
cess. Such attacks may be performed using
friends list or posting messages on the walls
of friends.
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Multiparty access model (Hu et al., 2013)
is proposed for preserving private data by
categorizing OSN users as owner, contribu-
tor, stakeholder, and disseminator. When-
ever an access request is made, the policy
evaluation is performed with respect to the
policies of relevant parties and the final deci-
sion is based on by their decision, sensitivity
voting schemes or different types of conflict
resolution such as threshold-based, strategy-
based or for dissemination control.
It is also important to know how infor-
mation about a person is revealed as an out-
come of search results. Paradesi et al. (2012)
point out the problem of the privacy of social
networks and provide an interface, Policy
Aware Social Miner (PASM), which makes
it possible for the users to create policies
to guide the consumers how searches about
them should be executed. People may share
a content within a specific context which
is not harmful, but when it is viewed to-
gether with other shared content this may
picture the person in a different way or may
be harmful to this person. In their system,
a data consumer enters the user’s Facebook
username, keywords to search, and the pur-
pose of the search such as employment, com-
mercial, financial, and medical. Users can
keep their privacy restricting access, refuta-
tion, and filtering. Users may restrict ac-
cess to their profiles by no-employment, no-
commercial, and no-medical options. Refu-
tation allows users to refuse the accuracy or
the ownership of information. Users may
also use filtering to hide posts having specific
words. While this interface can be effectively
used for Facebook, it can also be used for
Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, or other social
networks.
It is important to compare how technical
methods and legal frameworks work in case
of improper use of private information on
OSNs. Sayaf et al. (2013) address the pri-
vacy preservation of users in social software
by comparing technical methods (e.g., ser-
vices provided by OSNs) and legal frame-
works (i.e., laws) is important . Access
control methods (ACMs) and accountability
methods are chosen as the technical meth-
ods. The Directive 95/46/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council ‘on
the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data’ is used to com-
pare with the chosen technical methods. In
terms of privacy control, they analyze the
control of content, control of audience, link-
ing to the user, and protection of data. Cer-
tain approaches of access control that aim
at enabling users to control who can ac-
cess their data are reviewed. ACMs pro-
vide more control over the data on personal
exemption use than laws; however, ACMs
are difficult to use. Nevertheless, ACMs do
not restrict enough how OSN providers and
third-parties use the information. Account-
ability and audit approaches may identify
misconduct by analyzing the logged inter-
actions of the user. The technical and le-
gal frameworks are not necessarily consistent
and it is suggested that ethical framework
can be achieved after integrating both legal
and technical frameworks.
4.1.3 Methods for Increasing User
Awareness of Privacy
The main goal of increasing user awareness
is to inform how much information about the
user is revealed so that the user can take nec-
essary precautions. For example, Heatherly
et al. (2013) show that private information
leakage can be reduced by removing some
details from the profiles and removing some
friendship links. Brown et al. (2008) suggest
that friends of users should also make their
profiles private. Using images instead of text
for sensitive attributes or blocking contex-
tual information from non-friends are some
suggestions that could be implemented by
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OSN service providers. Measuring the pri-
vacy of a social network (Y. Wang & Nepali,
2013) or protecting privacy by concealing
users privacy (I. Singh et al., 2012; Sayaf
et al., 2013) may require tools to be im-
plemented for protection of users’ privacy.
Moreover, Irani, Webb, et al. (2011) suggest
that account recovery services should indi-
cate how strong account recovery questions
are.
Private information (e.g., address, rela-
tionships, visited locations) of many users
in online review sites are inadvertently dis-
closed with their reviews. Such private infor-
mation about a person may be attacked from
their online reviews. If the attacker knows
the identity of a user, private information
disclosed in reviews can be combined with in-
formation from other sources. Burkholder &
Greenstadt (2012) aim to determine whether
such detailed private information is disclosed
or not. Types of unstructured and struc-
tured information made public by online re-
view sites are characterized, and a privacy
check tool is developed. Three keyword cat-
egories were used for keyword matching to
detect privacy disclosure: relationship, loca-
tion, and temporal. Relationship keywords
are used to catch potentially inadvertent dis-
closures of relationships or information tied
to relationships. Potentially inadvertent dis-
closures of the location of a user or user’s
home are identified by location keywords.
Temporal keywords are used to find poten-
tially inadvertent disclosures such as loca-
tion of a user at a given time or how often the
user goes to a specific place. Words in the
reviews are then compared with keywords in
the given keyword list. The Natural Lan-
guage Toolkit (NLTK) (Steven et al., 2009)
is used to scan each review for name recog-
nition. Keyword matches and recognized
names are counted per review. The total
number of matches for a given keyword cate-
gory and the total number of matches for in-
dividual keywords are computed. The num-
ber of named-entity matches, actual named-
entity counts, and the percentage of keyword
matches by category are provided in their
analysis. In their experiments, they used
Amazon, Netflix, Yelp, OpenTable, and Tri-
pAdvisor as online review sites. For each
online review site, 10 items were selected for
review scrape and analysis. Items were se-
lected based on popularity because it is as-
sumed that more popular items would have
a greater number of lengthy reviews. Using
this tool, potentially sensitive review text is
annotated by keyword matching and named-
entity recognition, and awareness of the pri-
vacy threat in online review sites is increased
through examples and statistics.
Rather than analyzing attacks on real so-
cial networks, a model of an online social net-
work can be built and analyzed against at-
tacks. White et al. (2013) developed a model
of an online social network and simulated an
attack towards this model. A game theoretic
approach is used for the attack to analyze
the actions an attacker and how much dam-
age the attacker may cause to the system.
The simulation results help to figure out the
weakest points in the system. The authors
explain four different levels of information
sharing: optimal, under-shared, over-shared,
and hybrid states. Their game theoretic ap-
proach also helps users determine their opti-
mum level of sharing.
Alternative way of identifying how much
information could be leaked is to develop
quantifiable measures for preserving privacy.
Y. Wang & Nepali (2013) proposed three pri-
vacy index measures based on three different
privacy measurement functions.
• Weighted Privacy Index (w-PIDX) mea-
sures an entity’s privacy based on
known attribute list weight.
• Maximum Privacy Index (m-PIDX)
measures an entity’s privacy based on
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the maximum attribute impact factor of
all the known attributes.
• Composite Privacy Index (c-PIDX)
measures an entity’s privacy based on
composite privacy measurement factors.
The efficacy of the PIDXes is evaluated in
various user groups by different testing sce-
narios. In an actor model, an actor is a so-
cial entity (e.g., people, organization, etc.)
in a social network. Actor has certain char-
acteristics represented as attributes. Each
attribute has a different impact on privacy
called as Attribute Privacy Impact Factor
(APIF). In addition, each attribute is as-
signed a sensitivity value indicating the sen-
sitivity of information revealed by that at-
tribute. They use probability to describe
hidden information and virtual attributes as
a reflection of information visibility. Virtual
attribute describes a group of attributes be-
havior and their impact on privacy. A vir-
tual attribute may have significant impact
on the privacy of an actor. Among all the
attributes in an actor model, if certain at-
tributes are known, privacy might be dis-
closed. Privacy index is used to describe
an entity’s privacy exposure factor based on
the known attributes. It is computed using
privacy impact of known attributes. If it is
lower than given threshold T , privacy is con-
sidered to be preserved.
Preliminary attributes are extracted from
social networking sites’ personal profile and
privacy settings. 20 attributes including
name, SSN, birth date, education, etc. are
selected for testing, and a privacy impact
factor is assigned to each attribute. The
three PIDXes are evaluated when known at-
tributes change incrementally for different
user groups. While w-PIDX is not good
for privacy ranking, m-PIDX is not good at
measuring privacy increment change. Tests
and analysis show that composite privacy in-
dex measures best the privacy for social net-
work actor model.
User privacy has become an important
concern in online social networks (OSNs).
The users should be notified of inadvertent
privacy disclosures by both client-side and
server privacy check tools. However, find-
ing the best privacy preservation technique
is not a simple task.
4.2 Handling Fake Identities
Since true identities of users at social net-
work sites may not be known, it is important
to protect users by identifying real and fake
user accounts. For example, friendship re-
quests may not always come from a real per-
son. There are different types of users such
as fake users, bots that generate automatic
messages, and cyborgs (human-assisted bots
or bot-assisted humans) (Z. Chu et al.,
2010) and spammers (M. Singh et al., 2016;
A. H. Wang, 2010). Criminals such as stalk-
ers, sex offenders, etc. may also take the ad-
vantage of OSNs and hide their true identi-
ties. Therefore detecting these types of users
is important for taking secure actions and as
well as performing forensics investigations.
Strong Captchas are recommended to
avoid automated identity cloning attacks
(Bilge et al., 2009). When new accounts are
created OSNs may require valid IDs. In case
the system is able to identify candidate fake
identities, those users could be requested
to answer questions from his or her friends
properly (Schechter et al., 2009). Forging
identity attacks could be minimized if a per-
son’s identity is determined with respect to
his/her contacts or whom he/she communi-
cates in the network (Zhang et al., 2010).
Alternative methods may include analyzing
activities of fake identities or their response
to the validation process (Jin et al., 2011).
It is important for forensics investigators
to identify fake profiles. The first step of
fake identity detection is separating human
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users from bots and cyborgs. Once human
users are detected, their true identity may
be revealed using multiple online social net-
works and analyzing contents of messages for
authorship. In this section we discuss the
studies focusing on categorization of users on
OSNs, profile matching by comparing mul-
tiple networks, and identifying the true au-
thors of online postings. We briefly look into
detection of profile deception. Since some at-
tacks such as de-anonymization attacks are
launched by sybil nodes, it is critical for sys-
tems to limit the number of fake identities
that could be created to thwart such attacks.
4.2.1 Categorizing Users
The users may be exposed to different types
of interactions on online social networks. In
Twitter, there are some tweets posted by au-
tomated programs known as bots. In ad-
dition, cyborgs have recently emerged on
OSNs. In order to assist human users in
identifying whom they are interacting with,
Z. Chu et al. (2010) focus on the classifi-
cation of human, bot, and cyborg accounts
on Twitter. The authors analyze a collec-
tion of over 500K accounts to see the dif-
ferences among human, bot, and cyborg in
terms of tweeting behavior, tweet content,
and account properties. According to their
analysis, a classification system is proposed
which includes the following four parts: (i)
an entropy-based component, (ii) a machine-
learning-based component, (iii) an account
properties component, and (iv) a decision
maker. The entropy-based component calcu-
lates the entropy (and corrected conditional
entropy) of inter-tweet delays of a Twitter
user. A lower entropy indicates periodic or
regular timing of tweeting behavior, a sign
of automation, whereas a higher entropy im-
plies irregular behavior, a sign of human par-
ticipation. The machine learning component
is used to determine whether the tweet con-
tent is a spam or not based on the learned
text patterns. The account properties com-
ponent checks properties such as URL ratio,
tweeting device makeup, etc. and generates
a real-number value for each property. These
three components create a set of features
that are used to train a classifier. A classifi-
cation score is assigned to each class and the
class having the highest score is used as the
indicator of a bot, cyborg, or human. In the
experiments, 1K cyborgs, 1K humans, and
1K bots are used for validation. The sensi-
tivity values are obtained as 82.80%, 93.70%,
and 94.90% for cyborg, bot, and human cat-
egories respectively. The authors also con-
clude that bots are not misclassified as hu-
mans by their system and vice versa.
Behavior-based anomaly detection tech-
niques can also be used for detecting fake
identities (Bilge et al., 2009). Viswanath et
al. (2014) apply principal component analy-
sis on temporal, spatial, spatiotemporal and
combination of these features for detecting
anomalous behavior and use it for detect-
ing fake, compromised, and colluding iden-
tities without using a priori labeling while
achieving low false-positive rates. They have
achieved 66% accuracy of detecting anoma-
lous behavior regarding fake, compromised
and colluding identities with 0.35 false posi-
tives corresponding to 94% of misbehavior.
4.2.2 Matching Profiles across
Multiple Networks
Nowadays, people have a separate account
for each different social network. So, entity
resolution for online social networks is im-
portant to match profiles of the same per-
son across multiple OSNs using available in-
formation in their profiles and networks. In
other words, two different user profiles from
two different OSNs can be matched based
on the features extracted from user profile
and networks. There are some studies about
profile matching and while some of them just
use profiles of users (Peled et al., 2013), some
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of them use friend networks.
Peled et al. (2013) provide a four-step al-
gorithm for entity resolution based on user
profiles: data acquisition, feature extraction,
training set construction, and building the
model. In the data acquisition stage, ir-
relevant data are filtered out after crawl-
ing user profiles. Feature extraction stage
extracts features for comparing two pro-
files from two different OSNs. Three dif-
ferent types of features are created: name
based, general user information based, and
social network topological features. Name-
based features target name similarity and
use the following list of name similarity mea-
sures: Soundex, difference, longest common
sub-string (LCS), compression, Damareau
Levenshthein, Jaro Winkler, n-gram, VMN
(Vosecky et al., 2009). General user infor-
mation based features are compared using
locations distance, current employer similar-
ity (n-gram, Damareau Levenshthein, Jaro
Winkler), Jaccard, semi vector space model
similarity, and vector space model of full
profile similarity. Social network topologi-
cal features include the number of mutual
(common) friends and the number of mu-
tual friends of friends. When building the
training set in the third stage, users who are
members of both networks are identified ac-
cording to their names by performing a cross
reference check between the collected users’
profiles. Next, each matched pair of profiles
is checked manually using the profile photos
to see whether they belong to the same real
person. A label (match or a non-match) is
given to each checked pair. The remaining
users whose names did not match are used to
create negative pairs. Then a model is con-
structed by using the training dataset in the
last stage. In the experiment stage, 16,561
user profiles from Facebook and 15,430 from
Xing are used. Among the collected profiles,
464 pairs of users are detected as the same
user (with the same first and last names)
in Xing and Facebook. AdaBoost, Rota-
tion Forest, Random Forest, Logistics Model
Tree (LMT), LogitBoost and Artificial Neu-
ral Networks are used to build the classifier
model. According to the performed experi-
ments in this work, it is observed that even
though the name based features are the most
important ones, the best results are obtained
when 27 features are combined. The best
score was obtained using LogitBoost with
0.98 AUC (area-under-the-curve).
To extend the profile matching method,
a structural approach is proposed to iden-
tify a user based on their friend network in
(Vosecky et al., 2010). When some part of a
user profile is missing or unavailable, friend
network can be useful for profile matching.
The total number of mutual friends is deter-
mined between two users’ friend lists on two
different domains. The friends’ names are
matched and a similarity score is computed
using a match name function. All similar-
ity scores above 0.75 are added to obtain a
total friends overlap score. Structural ap-
proach is combined with profile matching ap-
proach. To evaluate their methods, they use
a dataset crawled from Facebook and Stu-
diVZ. A multi-layer perceptron (MLP), a lo-
gistic regression method (LogitBoost) and
an Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) are ap-
plied for classification and their performance
is compared. AdaBoost yields particularly
the highest accuracy (93%) in their experi-
ments.
While many people have accounts on mul-
tiple online social networks, some people also
use several accounts on a single social media
site with different user names. It is impor-
tant to detect users who use multiple aliases
for catching terrorists and extremists as they
may lead people to commit crimes (see the
case of owner of many personae Joshua Gold-
berg (Justice.gov, 2017)). Johansson et al.
(2013) present four different matching tech-
niques to identify users with multiple aliases.
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These are (i) string-based, (ii) stylometric-
based, (iii) time profile-based, and (iv) social
network based matching techniques. String-
based matching is based on alias names us-
ing Jaro-Winkler edit distance. Time-profile
based matching is based on the publishing
time of the posts. The time of day is dis-
cretized into equal-sized intervals. A feature
vector that represents the number of posts
per hour is created. Euclidean distance is
used to measure the difference of two vec-
tors. Stylometric matching is based on the
statistical analysis of writing style such as
the length of words and sentences, the num-
ber of letters, digits, punctuation and func-
tion words. Cosine similarity is used to mea-
sure similarity between these feature vectors.
Their social network based matching is based
on thread or friend information. They try to
see how two aliases have similar networks us-
ing Jaccard similarity of neighbors, which is
the ratio of the number of common neighbors
to the number of union of neighbors. For
experimental analysis, they used data com-
posed of 9 million documents from Irish web-
site forum (https://www.boards.ie). The
aliases who have more than 60 posts are in-
vestigated. For analysis, basically two ver-
sions of each user are built where one ver-
sion has the odd numbered posts and the
other version has the even numbered posts.
If the selected alias appears within top-N
rankings (N = 1 or N = 3), alias match-
ing is considered as success. The experiment
results show that time profile-based match-
ing has higher accuracy than stylometric-
based matching. The combination of both
matching techniques (time profile and sty-
lometric) gives significantly better accuracy
results than applying them individually. The
accuracies for 50, 250, and 1K users were
70%, 55%, and 43%, respectively. The accu-
racy increased to 80%, 70%, and 56% for 50,
250, and 1K users, respectively, when top-3
aliases were considered for success.
4.2.3 Authorship Analysis
Messages posted on social media give impor-
tant information about their authors. Each
person has distinguishing stylometric fea-
tures as his or her writeprints. Authorship
analysis of messages may be performed for
cyberforensics investigations. A variety of
computer-aided statistical methods are used
to analyze text to determine the most plau-
sible author of a piece of text in authorship
identification. Orebaugh & Allnutt (2010)
present an Instant Messaging (IM) author-
ship analysis framework to determine the
identity of an author. The proposed frame-
work is composed of data pre-processing, fea-
ture extraction, and classification stages. In
the data pre-processing stage, the messages
are parsed and irrelevant data such as meta-
data and noise are filtered out. The logs are
split into conversations based on the number
of messages per conversation. Conversations
are fed to the feature extraction module. In-
stant Messaging feature set consists of 356
features composed of 200 lexical, 154 syn-
tactic, and 2 structural features. The lexi-
cal features consist of 20 character-based, 3
word-based, 59 abbreviation frequency, and
42 emoticons frequency features. The syn-
tactic features are composed of 146 function
word frequency and 8 punctuation frequency
features. The structural features consist of
the average number of words and characters
per message. For classification, C4.5 deci-
sion tree, Naive Bayes, SVM, and k-nearest
neighborhood classifiers are evaluated. SVM
provided better and consistent results as the
number of authors increased from 2 to 19.
The best accuracy was 84.4% when all fea-
tures are used with SVM for 25 authors with
50 messages per conversation.
Behavioral biometrics are acquired over
time and can be used to recognize or ver-
ify the identity of a person. Orebaugh et al.
(2014) use behavioral biometrics-based in-
Page 98 c© 2016 ADFSL
A Survey of Social Network Forensics JDFSL V11N4
stant messaging writeprints as cyberforen-
sics input. Author writeprints are created
with stylometric features extracted from IM
messages and statistical methods are used to
analyze and evaluate the writeprints. Sim-
ilar to the study by Orebaugh & Allnutt
(2010), their framework includes develop-
ing a stylometric feature set, pre-processing
the data, creating writeprints and creating
PCA (principal components analysis) visu-
alizations of writeprints. They use a 356-
dimensional vector as the feature set includ-
ing lexical, syntactic, and structural fea-
tures. Conversations are created as a set
of messages {M1, . . . ,Mp} by splitting logs
in the writeprint extractor module. These
conversations are used to define stylomet-
ric features. For each set of messages
{M1, . . . ,Mp} of each supplied author (An),
a writeprint (Wx) is given as the output. A
writeprint is a t-dimensional vector, where
t represents the total number of features.
PCA models are used for dimension reduc-
tion on the writeprints after normalization
and standardization. Gnuplot is used for
visualization. In their experiments, per-
sonal IM conversation logs with and with-
out author information are used for evalua-
tion. Their plots with different settings for
datasets with author information show sepa-
rate groupings for each author. Plots for un-
known author show some separation among
the authors.
4.2.4 Detecting Deception
Deception became particularly critical topic
when examining social media services where
interactions between victims and deceivers
are not fully controlled. Alowibdi et al.
(2014) analyze gender deception for Twit-
ter since Twitter profiles do not have gen-
der attribute. They calculate a gender score
and male trending factor on twitter data by
using username, first name, and 5 profile
colors as feature vectors with hybrid clas-
sifiers based on Naive Bayes and Decision
trees. The color features are composed of
background color, text color, link color, side-
bar fill color, and sidebar border color. If a
user provides Facebook profile link, the gen-
der of that user is extracted from the Face-
book profile. The genders extracted from
Facebook profiles are used as ground-truth
in order to build the model for gender predic-
tion. Out of 192K profile data collected, to
balance male-female distribution, randomly
87.3K male and 87.3K female accounts were
selected and then investigated. Gender pre-
diction was performed based on first names
(f), usernames (u), and color features (c).
Gender prediction accuracies by first name,
username, colors and all-combined are 82%,
70%, 75%, and 85%, respectively. Male
trending factor is calculated for each user:
m = (wf ∗sf+wu∗su+wc∗sc)/(wf+wu+wc)
where wf , wu, and wc are weights of the three
gender indicators (first names, usernames,
and the 5 color characteristics combined). w
weight values represent the difference of ac-
curacy from baseline, wf = 82% − 50% =
32%. A sensitivity value for each factor (sf ,
su, and sc) is calculated with respect to the
proportion of female vs. male having that
feature. For instance, the name “Mary” has
a high sensitivity value close to 1.0 for fe-
males. Collected male trending values are di-
vided into 5 categories by standard deviation
and variance as in Table 5. Weak female and
weak male groups are considered as decep-
tive groups. After manually checking 5% of
the data, 24 out of 133 weak male and 11 out
of 188 weak female users were determined to
be quite deceptive. In addition to gender de-
tection, identifying other attributes such as
age, geo-location, and profession has been
covered in Tuna et al. (2016).
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Table 5. Five groups depending on the male
index
Strong female 0 ≤ m ≤ µ− 2σ
Weak female µ− 2σ ≤ m ≤ µ− σ
Weak male µ+ σ ≤ m ≤ µ+ 2σ
Strong male µ+ 2σ ≤ m ≤ 1
Neutral otherwise
4.2.5 Defense Methods for
De-anonymization
Trusted certification, resource testing and
recurring costs are some methods to deal
with de-anonymization and sybil attacks.
In trusted certification, where only certi-
fied users can join the network, may com-
pletely eliminate the sybil attack (Douceur,
2002). Resource testing analyzes network
structure, network bandwidth, computa-
tional and storage resources, and the number
of IP addresses associated for nodes corre-
sponding to real users. Recurring validation
such as Captchas while creating new nodes
may minimize the creation of sybil nodes
(Gao et al., 2011).
SybilGuard (Yu et al., 2006), SybilLimit
(Yu et al., 2008), SybilRank (Cao et al.,
2012) and SybilDefender (Wei et al., 2012)
are some methods to thwart sybil attacks.
SybilGuard uses “quotient cuts” (i.e., re-
moving small number of attack edges would
lead removing large number of nodes from
the graphs) between trustable nodes and
sybil nodes by removing a small set of edges
(Yu et al., 2006). While SybilGuard lim-
its the number of sybil nodes, it may accept
O(
√
nlogn) nodes which could be large if the
network is large. Moreover, it assumes that
the social network is fast mixing without val-
idation. SybilLimit method shows that ac-
tual social networks are mixing within 10 to
20 nodes despite having social communities.
SybilLimit reduces the number of accepted
nodes by a factor of Θ(
√
n). SybilGuard first
identifies a sybil node and then applies sybil
community detection algorithm to identify
the sybil community. The number of at-
tack edges could be limited by allowing users
to rate their relationships or using an activ-
ity network graph that indicates interactions
among users rather than only relationships.
SybilRank detects sybil nodes in 3 stages:
(i) propagating trust via O(logn) power it-
erations, (ii) ranking nodes based on degree-
normalized trust, and (iii) annotating some
of the fake nodes. Their main contribution is
to be able to rank nodes where lower values
indicate the likelihood of being a sybil node.
Alvisi et al. (2013) list four commonly used
properties of structural graphs: popularity
(degree of a node), small distance property
(the maximum distance between any nodes
in a social graph), clustering coefficient (re-
lated to the number of friendships of a user
to the number of friendships among friends),
and conductance (the ratio of the number of
outgoing edges from the graph to the num-
ber of edges in the graph). The conductance
property makes harder than other properties
to act as undetected while not being fully
fool-proof.
Do these de-anonymization defense meth-
ods make OSNs safe? In some scenarios,
researchers develop de-anonymization tech-
niques and then develop possible defense
strategies against those types of techniques.
Alvisi et al. (2013) point out the Maginot
syndrome for OSNs. In other words, while
building strong defenses against sybil at-
tacks, sophisticated attacks can be designed
that exploit the weaknesses of these defenses.
OSNs might be more susceptible for sophis-
ticated attacks or undetected attacks than
considered.
4.3 Handling Fake Messages
Content-based analysis of messages
and postings is needed to detect il-
legal/inappropriate postings and fake
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messages and to avoid deception. Since
OSNs also allow posting images, videos, and
audio, OSN service providers should detect
harmful messages and postings and remove
or block them in real time. Accounts could
be hacked (Zangerle & Specht, 2014) and
OSN service providers should detect account
hacks by analyzing messages. Moreover,
users might be infected by malware and
methods are needed to limit the propagation
of malware and spam as well as harmful
messages. The spread of malicious messages
should be prevented if possible. Otherwise,
they should be detected, and doubtful
messages should be demoted by the system.
OSN service providers may also analyze the
credibility of messages. Lastly, we briefly
overview how the resilience of OSNs could
be improved to avoid the harmful results of
malicious messages.
4.3.1 Prevention, Detection and
Demotion
The countermeasures for spams are grouped
as detection, demotion, and prevention by
(Heymann et al., 2007). These countermea-
sures could be generalized to all types of
messages. Detection-based methods try to
identify spams and remove them by meth-
ods such as text classification, user behav-
ior analysis, link analysis, manual user iden-
tification, and manual moderator identifica-
tion. Brown et al. (2008) and W. Xu et al.
(2010) suggest that OSN service providers
may setup fake accounts or “decoy friends”
to detect context-aware spam, worms and
propagation of possible worms. OSN ser-
vice providers may limit the number of mem-
berships of accounts to restrict possible fake
accounts. Demotion-based methods try to
lower the rank of spams. Prevention-based
methods add barriers for spams by changing
interfaces or limiting user actions by incorpo-
rating Captchas, account fees, proof of work,
pay per action, community size limits, and
hidden or partitioned input interfaces. Digi-
tally signed messages or browser alerts may
be helpful to thwart phishing attacks (Chou
et al., 2004).
4.3.2 Analyzing Credibility of
Messages
Determining the truth of messages is a chal-
lenging task. False messages can easily be
spread through OSNs and may result in fi-
nancial loss or fatal outcomes. OSN service
providers should develop effective methods
to analyze the credibility of messages.
In the literature, there are some research
studies that aim to detect footprints of fake
messages and posts. Zubiaga & Ji (2014)
study the credibility of information shared
on social networks, particularly after natural
calamities such as Hurricane Sandy stroke
the US. In such serious moments, it is impor-
tant to have reliable and trustworthy infor-
mation shared on the Internet. In this study,
Zubiaga & Ji (2014) analyze the accuracy of
credibility perceptions on different features
of witness pictures posted on Twitter dur-
ing Hurricane Sandy’s impact and aftermath
in the East Coast of the United States in
October 2012. They analyze credibility rat-
ings provided by Amazon Mechanical Turk2
(AMT) workers on different features of the
tweets with those pictures. They evaluate
their assessments by identifying real and fake
pictures from those features, and then com-
pare with the results obtained by experts.
They determine factors and features for as-
sessing credibility. They identify (i) features
that can improve accuracy of credibility per-
ceptions such as author details currently not
readily available on Twitter’s feeds, (ii) fea-
tures that may harm accuracy, such as writ-
ing and spelling in tweets, and (iii) other fac-
tors that influence users’ perceptions (e.g.,
repeated exposure of the same hoax received
from different authors leads users to mistak-
enly getting convinced about its veracity).
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A total of 32 pictures were analyzed for the
Hurricane Sandy. For each picture, 6 ratings
were obtained: authority, text plausibility,
picture plausibility, corroboration, presenta-
tion, and the whole tweet. Since the authors
were already given final assessments for each
picture by professionals, they were interested
in analyzing not only how features were re-
lated to each other, but also in studying the
accuracy of AMT workers when rating each
feature (i.e., verifying tweets). The results
show that the whole tweet helped to cor-
rectly distinguish real tweets from fake ones
in terms of recall.
Another way to check credibility is to an-
alyze messages during and after an event.
Sikdar et al. (2013) provide a method on
how to construct reliable ground truth val-
ues or identify credibility for the microblog-
ging sites such as Twitter. They collected
two different datasets from Twitter using
the Streaming API (Twitter, 2017) for mes-
sages on Hurricane Sandy during and after
the hurricane. The first dataset consists of a
large group of people and many of them may
not know each other. Also, since this dataset
was collected while the hurricane was devel-
oping, there exists some uncertainty about
the hurricane in the first dataset. On the
other hand, the users of the second dataset
were more connected, and they were more
knowledgeable about the event. The sec-
ond dataset was collected by using the key-
word “#occupysandy,” which is a relief effort
to distribute resources. Therefore, the sec-
ond dataset is more credible than the first
dataset. In order to perform the analysis
they collected samples of tweets from each
dataset. They conducted two surveys using
MTurk users to evaluate the credibility of
messages with 6 levels of credibility opinion
(can’t-answer, strongly non-credible, moder-
ately non-credible, neutral, moderately cred-
ible, and strongly credible). The first survey
includes messages, source image, and num-
ber of retweets. The second survey includes
messages only.
In these surveys, they also ask users to
annotate the tweets regarding the credibil-
ity of the message newsworthiness, and the
credibility of the user. For the ground truth
selection, they look at the correlation be-
tween credibility judgments in both surveys.
They find that there is no correlation be-
tween credibility of messages in both sur-
veys. However, the credible newsworthy
messages of the first and second surveys are
highly correlated. They also find out cred-
ibility of messages, credibility of users, and
newsworthiness of tweets are highly corre-
lated in the first survey.
Psychologists have shown that human be-
havior deviate from its normal behavior
when a person lies. Bhaskaran et al. (2011)
focus on the eye movements to detect the
deceits. In their experiments, 132 human
subjects were interviewed using two types of
questions: (i) questions involving basic con-
versations and (ii) critical questions which
involve reward or punishment. These inter-
views were video recorded. The subjects also
filled out questionnaires to indicate if they
lied or not. In order to collect the data for
their experiments, the eye pupil regions were
detected using image processing techniques
to learn the behavioral features. The au-
thors used Bayesian model of eye movements
in the basic conversation period to learn the
normal behavior of a person. The rest of
the interview was divided into time slots and
each slot was evaluated using the trained
model by computing its log-likelihood. Devi-
ations from normal behavior were tested us-
ing the log likelihoods of each time slot. De-
ceit and non-deceit videos showed very dis-
tinctive patterns. In the testing part of the
process on the 40 subjects, they had 82.5%
accuracy in deceit detection.
Understanding the dynamics of deception
and deceptive behaviors in online social net-
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works is both crucial and significantly chal-
lenging. It requires new tools, softwares, and
new perspectives in applied analyses to im-
prove the findings. The expansion in the on-
line social media world continues with the
help of diverse set of tools which aim to
ease their usage for the end users. Hence,
aforementioned methods, tools and models
are particularly important for law enforce-
ment and forensics investigators to detect
certain activities (e.g., deception, fake mes-
sages, spam) which may eventually evolve to
criminal ones.
4.3.3 Improving Resilience to
Infection
To avoid infection of user systems by mali-
cious malware or messages, it is important
to check the susceptibility of users to such
infection. If user systems are infected, the
infected users may inform neighbors as soon
as possible or the OSN provider may de-
velop the network in a way that malicious
messages are quarantined before being prop-
agated to other parts of the network.
Susceptibility of Users to Infection.
It may be possible to determine the sus-
ceptibility of users for social bot attacks
and whether users are infected or not (Wag-
ner et al., 2012). Wagner et al. (2012)
extract a wide set of linguistic, network
(hub and authority score, in- and out-degree,
clustering coefficient) and behavioral (con-
versational variety, conversational balance,
conversational coverage, lexical variety, lex-
ical balance, topical variety, topical bal-
ance, informational variety, informational
balance, informational coverage, temporal
variety, temporal balance, temporal cover-
age) features to determine the susceptibility
of users. They found out that susceptible
users tend to use OSN for a conversational
purpose and communicate with many differ-
ent users using more social words and show
more affection than non-susceptible users on
Twitter. This shows that the active users
of OSNs are vulnerable to social bot attacks
than passive users.
Reaction to Infection. The attacker
may consider the number of neighbors as well
as the number of neighbors to be active after
being infected for effective malware propaga-
tion (Yan et al., 2011). User-oriented defense
methods are categorized as active and reac-
tive (Yan et al., 2011). In active defense,
when a machine recovers from infection, it
informs neighbors and the neighbor getting
this message becomes immune when it be-
comes active. If a neighbor transmits this
message to its other neighbors then it is con-
sidered an active defense otherwise it is reac-
tive defense. Detecting malware as quickly
as possible is critical; however, active defense
is still effective even with low detection rate.
Network Sanitation. OSN service
providers may analyze URLs in messages
from or to sanitized nodes selected based
on the degree of a node, active nodes, or
activities and make sure that the messages
from/to these nodes are malware free (Yan
et al., 2011). In another approach, Yan et
al. (2011) propose preventive containment
where the graph is partitioned into islands
and it is guaranteed that malware does not
propagate from one island to another island.
4.4 Handling Fake
Relationships
OSNs introduce different types of relation-
ships, trust strength and interaction inten-
sity (Zhang et al., 2010). The relationships
could be bi-directional as friendship relation-
ships or one-directional as in follower or fan
relationships. Trust strength indicates how
much a user trusts another user on a gen-
eral or specific topic. Interaction intensity
involves both quantity and quality of inter-
actions between users. Social link forging
(fake relationship) attacks can be avoided or
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minimized by the trust strength and interac-
tion intensity of relationships, and moreover,
since OSN users may also meet face-to-face,
the true identities of (malicious) users are
likely to be revealed. The trust path between
users can help to determine the position of a
node.
OSN service providers should help to find
trustable friends. Dong et al. (2011) provide
a method of finding secure friends by letting
users utilize virtual IDs and digital signa-
tures for authentication, applying proximity
prefiltering by eliminating profiles that are
less likely to be friends and enhancing this
scheme with homomorphic cryptography to
validate social coordinates and proximity re-
sults.
Fake relationships can be minimized by in-
creasing user awareness. Bilge et al. (2009)
suggest that users should be more alert when
accepting friendships. On the other hand,
OSN service providers may look at the re-
lationships between users before suggest-
ing friendships beyond basic email look-up
(Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011). Similar to de-
tecting spam messages, a honeypot account
can be set up to detect requests from other
users (Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011). Irani,
Balduzzi, et al. (2011) suggest that the usage
of Captcha for incoming friendship requests
could be an additional barrier for reverse so-
cial engineering attacks.
OSN service providers should enhance
OSNs by providing tools that help users ac-
cept or reject some friendship or relation-
ships requests. Such tools will improve user’s
security and privacy. A Social Privacy Pro-
tector (SPP) software (Fire, Kagan, et al.,
2014), which is developed for Facebook, in-
cludes three protection layers to enhance the
user privacy. In the first layer, the software
identifies a friend of a user who might pose
a threat. Then this friend’s exposure is re-
stricted to the user’s personal information.
A credibility score is assigned to each friend
in their friend list according to the strength
of the connection between the user and
his/her friends. The strength of each con-
nection is computed based on different fea-
tures such as the number of common friends
and the number of pictures tagged in to-
gether. A simple heuristics or a more sophis-
ticated machine learning algorithm is used to
compute the credibility score. Friends with
lower scores have the higher likelihood of be-
ing fake profiles. In the second layer, Face-
book’s basic privacy settings are expanded
based on different types of social network us-
age profiles. The user’s internet activity and
the number of applications installed on the
user’s Facebook profile are observed. The
number of installed applications that have
access to user’s private information is pro-
vided as a warning to the user. The last layer
includes the HTTP Server to analyze, store,
and cache software results for each user. The
HTTP server is a part of the SPP responsi-
ble for connecting the SPP Firefox Add-on to
the SPP Facebook application. Also, some
statistics are provided about Facebook user
privacy settings, which were obtained by the
SPP Add-on. These statistics demonstrate
how Facebook users’ personal information
is exposed to fake profile attacks and third
party applications. Experiment data is col-
lected on each SPP’s user and his/her links.
The links of the user include different types
of Facebook friends: (i) friends who are rec-
ommended with restrictions by the applica-
tion due to a low connection-strength score,
(ii) friends who were restricted by the user,
(iii) friends who were not restricted by the
user, (iv) friends who were not recommended
with restrictions by the application, and (v)
friends who were deliberately chosen to be
restricted. Then, the collected data is used
to learn more about Facebook user’s privacy
settings, and classifiers are built using col-
lected data to identify Facebook profiles with
higher likelihoods of being fake.
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4.5 Data Tracing for Forensics
In many criminal cases, searching forensics
artifacts in the traces of social networks data
is essential for the success of an investiga-
tion. Hence, it is studied in a variety of con-
texts: collecting and creating new data rep-
resentations from different data sources by
crawling different websites (Huber, Mulaz-
zani, Leithner, et al., 2011) or tracking the
logs in system files (Turnbull & Randhawa,
2015). Due to the common usage of mobile
devices for social network access, mobile de-
vices have also been studied for recovering
traces of data for various activities (Mutawa
et al., 2012; H. Chu et al., 2014; Awan, 2015;
Norouzizadeh Dezfouli et al., 2016; Cahyani
et al., 2016).
4.5.1 Searching Traces of Data
Many online social networks provide APIs
for data collection. However, these avail-
able APIs and other tools that are used for
crawling data from online social networks
cannot guarantee the granularity and effi-
ciency of the data for proper analysis. So-
cial Snapshots (Huber, Mulazzani, Leithner,
et al., 2011) is developed to collect social net-
work data with the aim of harvesting more
data compared to the other available tools
such that it can be utilized more effectively
for searching and analyzing online evidence.
It is designed as a hybrid system of a web
browser and an online social network medi-
ator application having six modules: social
snapshot client, automated web browser, so-
cial network mediator, hijacking, digital im-
age forensics, and analysis. Social snapshot
client module is responsible to trigger the
process by using user credentials. Automated
web browser module takes care of simple
communication with the social network. So-
cial network mediator application is respon-
sible of harvesting data over the targeted
online social networks API. Hijacking mod-
ule is a basic network sniffer package that
collects legitimate HTTP cookies of an on-
line social network. Digital image forensics
module is responsible to match images gath-
ered from online social networks with their
original source. Finally, analysis module is
a parsing module that separates and cleans
the collected data. Social Snapshots is evalu-
ated with the participation of 25 human vol-
unteers. Facebook data has been collected
through the mediator application via using
the Graph API. The mediator application
collected 9,800 Facebook account elements
per test subject on average. 238 profiles have
been crawled and on average, 22 phone num-
bers, 65 instant messaging accounts, and 162
email addresses were collected. The datasets
of Social Snapshots consist of profile infor-
mation such as user data, private messages,
photos, etc. as well as the associated meta-
data such as internal timestamps and unique
identifiers which are quite significant for dig-
ital forensics investigation and security re-
search.
As mentioned earlier, accessing social net-
works via mobile devices is very common,
thus tracing data in mobile devices may pro-
vide help to track activities of people for
forensics analysis. Mutawa et al. (2012)
focus on conducting forensic analyses on
three widely used social networking appli-
cations: Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace.
The tests were conducted on three popu-
lar smartphones: BlackBerrys, iPhones, and
Android phones. In a very similar study,
Awan (2015) conducted forensic analyses
on Facebook, Twitter and Linkedn by us-
ing four type of smarthpones: BlackBerry,
iPhone, Android and Windows phone. In
both studies, the goal is to find the artifacts
of social network applications on these de-
vices for forensic analyses. The tests con-
sisted of installing the social networking ap-
plications on each device, conducting com-
mon user activities (e.g., uploading photos,
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Table 6. Social Network and mobile application data extraction for mobile forensic analyses
Mutawa et al. (2012) Awan (2015)
H. Chu et
al. (2014)
Cahyani et al.
(2016)
Device /
Operat-
ing
System
IOS(IPhone), Android
(Samsung), Blackberry
IOS(IPhone),
Android
(Samsung),
Windows
(Nokia),
Blackberry
PDA
Android
(Samsung),
Windows (Nokia)
Applica-
tion
Facebook. Twitter, MySpace
Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn
Facebook,
Google
Map
Dropbox, Google
Drive, OneDrive
Informa-
tion
collected
IOS - Facebook (user and
contact details, profile
picture URLs, photo uploads,
posted comments, friends
with active chat sessions),
Android - Facebook (user
and contact details,profile
picture URLs, photo uploads,
created albums, pictures
viewed with app,
mailbox/chat messages),
IOS - Twitter (for user and
people followed: user names,
profile picture URLs, tweets
posted with time stamps)
Android - Twitter (for user
and people followed: user
names, profile picture URLs,
posted tweets and photos,
other activity information
such as which device is used
to tweet),
IOS - MySpace (User
name/password, posted
comments with timestamps)
Android - MySpace (user
name/password, cookies &
cache files)
IOS&Android -
Facebook
(Profile name,
contact details,
images)
Windows -
Facebook (chat,
videos, images)
IOS&Android -
Twitter (profile
name, followers,
tweets)
Windows -
Twitter (tweets)
IOS&Android -
LinkedIn
(profile name,
contact details)
Windows -
LinkedIn
(Contact details)
Facebook
(email)
Google
Maps
(geo-
location)
Android -
Dropbox
(documents,
sounds, images,
videos)
Android -
Google Drive
(documents,
sounds, images,
videos)
Android -
OneDrive
(sounds, images,
videos)
Windows -
Dropbox&
OneDrive
(images)
Windows -
Google Drive
(NA)
Comment
No data could be gathered
from BlackBerry Devices
No data could be
gathered from
BlackBerry
Devices
In windows
device, only
image files were
successfully
uploaded
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posting comments, and sending emails) us-
ing each application, acquiring a forensically
sound logical image of each device, and then
performing manual forensic analysis on each
acquired logical image. The forensic anal-
yses were aimed at determining whether ac-
tivities conducted through these applications
were stored on the device’s internal mem-
ory. If so, the extent, significance, and loca-
tion of the data that could be found and re-
trieved from the logical image of each device
were determined. The results show that no
traces could be recovered from BlackBerry
devices. However, iPhone, Android and
Windows phones store a significant amount
of valuable data that could be recovered and
used by forensic investigators.
Cloud storage apps and and common us-
age of these apps in mobile devices make
researchers to perform forensic analyses on
these devices. Cahyani et al. (2016) stud-
ied the role of mobile forensics in terror-
ism investigations involving the use of cloud
apps: Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft
OneDrive. These cloud storage apps may be
used to store incriminating evidence while
communication apps may be used to ex-
change voice and video messages. By us-
ing forensic techniques, one could potentially
recover information such as chat logs, mul-
timedia files, contact lists, and geo-tagged
data, which can then be used to determine
the chain of events, and identify their asso-
ciates. A dataset comprises 37 files made up
of document, audio, picture, video and exe-
cutable files uploaded through these apps in
two devices with different operating systems:
android and windows phone. These files
and their artifacts on these devices were col-
lected using a combination of physical, logi-
cal and manual acquisition methods. As Ta-
ble 6 shows, most of the data were download-
able by client apps. In additon to that, all
sender-receiver account artifacts were gath-
ered by accessing the related local SQLite
database files in these mobile devices. User-
names, passwords, and the list of shared
files shared could be extracted. Finally,
H. Chu et al. (2014) worked in different en-
vironments and extracted geo-location info
recorded by Google Maps and Facebook ap-
plication from a personal digital assistant
(PDA) device. Data are gathered from the
image of the memory while the device is on.
In the traditional digital forensics inves-
tigations, examiner almost always analyzes
the log files collected from computer and net-
work systems. In addition to the analysis of
user created data in mobile devices discussed
above, analysis of log files produced by mo-
bile devices is also significantly important
for social network investigations. If a log
of operations by a user is maintained prop-
erly, this log could be analyzed for suspicious
data access. Turnbull & Randhawa (2015)
implemented a tool, ParFor (Parallax Foren-
sics), which provides a unified representation
of different data sources to support a higher
level reasoning. The hierarchy of files, di-
rectories and file systems, user accounts and
system information, system events, and user
events are examined to create an automated
rule based extraction system. For example,
if the login and logout time slots are kept
for a user, then the files which seem to be
changed by this user out of this time slots
can be reported as a suspicious activity.
4.5.2 Discussion
Successful information collection is one as-
pect of searching traces of data. However,
there are cases when too much insignificant
or unnecessary information could be col-
lected from mobile devices. Huber, Mulaz-
zani, Leithner, et al. (2011) propose to cre-
ate a timeline of the metadata they gathered
from Social Snapshot tool so that they can
be used in forensic analyses ( e.g., userA up-
loaded an image, userB commented, userA
responded and shared a video, etc.). This
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would notably help if the goal is to track time
based events. However, generic queries with-
out a time frame would require too much ef-
fort to analyze the metadata especially for
actively used social network profiles. There
is a need to filter out some of the information
from the metadata which will not really ef-
fect the analyses, but will speed up the man-
ual examination.
Despite significant studies collecting social
network information from mobile devices,
the upgrades and updates made by OSN
service providers and operating systems of
mobile devices make reusability of previous
work challenging. Huber, Mulazzani, Lei-
thner, et al. (2011) could get phone num-
bers and contact details for Facebook pro-
files by using Facebook graph API and other
crawling websites. Mutawa et al. (2012) and
Awan (2015) were able to get different so-
cial network usernames/passwords, contact
lists, and some related activities with their
timestamps from the internal memory of a
smartphone. H. Chu et al. (2014) man-
aged to track the user geolocation coordi-
nates with timestamps related to a facebook
account from a PDA device. Cahyani et
al. (2016) spotted the files and extracted
sender-receiver information from cloud apps
in mobile devices. Turnbull & Randhawa
(2015) were able to get only MSN messenger
contact lists from the user directories located
in hard disks. These studies show that even
though a lot of information can be gathered
from mobile devices, forensic examination of
smartphones for Social Network applications
is still challenging due to constant updates
in social network software, smartphone soft-
ware (operating system), and hardware up-
dates. As Mutawa et al. (2012) report, the
results for different types of applications for
different models of smartphones may change
dramatically after updates by the operating
system (OS) or the social network applica-
tion. For instance, SnapChat application
used to keep pictures on the device in an en-
crypted form. However, decryption key was
hard coded in the application. It was pos-
sible to decompile the application and re-
trieve the key in order to decrypt the files
to access the pictures. In the recent version
of the application however, encryption key
is not located in the application, hence it is
currently infeasible to decrypt the pictures.
We would then suggest to distinguish the OS
and hardware first, and then repeat the ex-
periment for each case separately rather than
collecting a result for a specific device or OS.
If the experiment can be done repeatedly
with different models of the devices and dif-
ferent versions of mobile OSs, weakness and
strength of a particular device and OS can
be identified for further investigations.
4.6 Summary
It is important to protect OSN users from
attacks and develop tools for forensics anal-
ysis to detect criminal activities and iden-
tify criminals. OSN service providers usu-
ally employ defense mechanisms through au-
thentications (e.g., Captchas), security and
privacy settings, internal mechanisms to de-
tect fake profiles or attacks, and reporting
malicious users or behaviors. Developing ef-
fective methods for protection and deploying
discouraging strategies for attackers is criti-
cal for trustable OSNs.
Forensics analysts may use authorship
analysis, profile matching, and user cate-
gorization techniques to identify fake users
on OSNs. Fake messages could be analyzed
by assigning credibility scores and demoted,
blocked and removed before they cause ac-
tual harm. OSN service providers may in-
form about the susceptibility of users and
develop methods for quarantining sections of
the network to avoid propagation of mali-
cious messages. OSN service providers may
also consider assigning scores to OSN users
and such scores could be used for accept-
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ing or rejecting friendship requests by users.
These scores could also be helpful to identify
fake identities for forensics analysts. Foren-
sics investigators may analyze the traces of
OSN data for collecting information about
criminals. Those traces may reveal the pro-
files used OSNs and the possible terror net-
works.
We have added a few more recommen-
dations to those suggested by (Fire, Gold-
schmidt, & Elovici, 2014) for OSN users:
1. not disclosing unnecessary personal in-
formation,
2. proper management of privacy and se-
curity settings,
3. rejecting friendships from strangers,
4. removing unnecessary or idle friend-
ships,
5. installing internet security software,
6. uninstalling third party applications,
7. informing about malicious users,
8. not disclosing your location,
9. not trusting your OSN friends and their
friends,
10. being alert to abnormal behavior of
friends and relatives using OSNs, and
11. monitoring online activities of your
child.
Based on our analysis of research studies,
OSN service providers should
1. avoid or limit auto-creation of fake iden-
tities,
2. increase anonymity of the network (e.g.,
by deploying fake accounts),
3. increase the security of messaging,
4. increase the strength and frequency of
security measures (e.g., Captchas),
5. validate users with IDs or phone num-
bers beyond email,
6. increase user awareness (e.g., informing
about how much privacy is disclosed),
7. develop effective and simple access con-
trol methods,
8. develop measures for trustability of
nodes, relationships, and messages (e.g.,
deploy methods to analyze anomalous
behaviors),
9. incorporate user validation techniques
to help users to confirm friendships,
10. deploy methods for reporting malicious
activities,
11. analyze content of messages and posts
for inappropriate material, and
12. label messages whether verified or not
and provide links from external re-
sources.
Forensics investigators need tools for
1. categorizing OSN users (i.e., bots, cy-
borgs, human users),
2. distinguishing fake identities and iden-
tifying true owners of fake profiles,
3. profile matching within a single OSN or
across multiple OSNs,
4. authorship analysis for OSNs,
5. detecting fake messages,
6. analyzing credibility of messages,
7. determining authenticity of relation-
ships, and
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8. searching traces of relevant OSN data to
solve cases.
Among the proposed defense techniques,
wrapper-based privacy preservation tech-
niques are designed with good will for honest
users; however, they provide another level
of shield for attackers. These defense tech-
niques should not strengthen the strategies
of attackers. Another issue is that it is
not possible to trust the defense methods
as they are usually detection based methods
and hard to verify their performance or ac-
curacy since it is not known how many fake
identities, relationships, and messages exist
in real OSNs. Typically, defense methods
consider possible ways of attacks and are de-
signed to protect from those types of attacks.
Margirot syndrome (discussed above) could
be a possibility for OSN defense methods.
5. OPEN RESEARCH
ISSUES AND
CONCLUSION
One of the most important novelties of the
new millennium is online social networks
with the advanced and simple communica-
tion technologies through easily accessible
devices such as smartphones. In the past,
one of the major limitations of forensics re-
search was availability of data for forensics
research. With publicly available online so-
cial network data and supporting APIs from
online social network sites, there have been
vast amount of data to be processed and
analyzed. Since OSNs are available world-
wide, they enable sharing of knowledge and
experiences for protecting against terrorist
attacks, criminal acts, and deception at dif-
ferent parts of the world.
In this paper, we provide an overview of
some techniques that are useful for social
network forensics. We have covered iden-
tifying network structures, determining the
ranks of individuals in these networks, spa-
tial behavior of crime/terror networks, de-
termining the similarity of terror networks,
information diffusion, a socio-economic fac-
tors leading to crimes and joining crime and
terror networks. We have analyzed social
attacks through online social networks and
organized them into four levels: criminal ac-
tivity, type of attack, scheme of attack, and
attack component. We have explained how
attacks are launched using various schemes
of attacks and attack components. With
the availability of affordable devices (such
as $35 Amazon Kindle), children enjoy the
entertainment and information provided by
the Internet. Nowadays, most online games
also provide a chat messaging system built in
them and children may be exposed to people
with indecent behavior. We have analyzed
a few papers for the protection of our chil-
dren. For protecting OSN users and foren-
sics analysis, we explained privacy preserva-
tion methods, user categorization, author-
ship analysis, profile matching, credibility
of messages, detecting deception, propos-
ing safe relationships, and finding traces of
OSNs on mobile devices for forensics analy-
sis.
Despite numerous and various approaches
for analyzing crime, terror networks and so-
cial attacks, these do not deter malicious
people to abuse OSNs and their users. Our
major goal in this paper was to present the
available approaches for forensics analysis to
prevent crimes, discourage malicious people
abusing these online social networks, solve
crimes and detect criminals and increase user
awareness of possible risks of using OSNs,
and recommend actions for forensics inves-
tigators, OSN service providers, and OSN
users. Fundamental components of forensics
analysis are likely to be the same but tech-
niques should evolve as OSNs improve and
provide more functionalities. We list possi-
ble issues with current approaches and pro-
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pose future research as follows:
1. Temporal Analysis of Crime and Terror
Networks. Many research studies aim
analyzing network structure and simi-
larities of such networks as mentioned
in Section 2. There are a few studies fo-
cusing on spatial analysis of these net-
works. However, temporal evolution of
these networks have not been studied
in depth. Some major crime and ter-
rorist networks are using OSNs for re-
cruitment. The temporal growth analy-
sis of these networks should be analyzed
and necessary precautions and analysis
should be done before these crime and
terror networks grow.
2. Accuracy of Detection. Forensics ana-
lysts should be aware that the accuracy
of detecting criminals, networks, fake
identities, social attacks, etc. could be
misleading. We do not have complete,
accurate and ground-truth information
about attacks and networks that uti-
lize OSNs. The analysis is usually per-
formed around known attacks and net-
works. Therefore, the accuracy of anal-
ysis is mostly related to the precision of
detection and it may not consider recall.
In other words, there may be many un-
detected or unknown attacks, fake iden-
tities, and networks on OSNs. Some re-
search studies consider possible attack
scenarios and verify whether OSNs are
stable or not towards such attacks. At-
tackers may come up with their own
schemes of attacks. Attackers are as-
sumed to have different behaviors, con-
nections, and profiles which could be
separated from regular users. It is also
possible for sophisticated attackers to
imitate a real person. Forensics analysts
should be cautious when relying on ac-
curacy of detection methods.
3. The Maginot Syndrome. It is likely that
the defense systems for OSNs might be
useless for sophisticated or undetected
attacks. Developing enhanced and pow-
erful defense methods may not make
OSNs safe. Especially considering the
fact that some possible attack scenarios
are developed by researchers, there is a
high risk of vulnerability of OSNs for
undetected and sophisticated attacks.
4. Trusting OSNs and Fake Identities.
There are users who do not trust OSNs
as well as users who are likely to be-
lieve what they see on OSNs. It is hard
to gain complete trust of users in pres-
ence of many possible attacks. Impor-
tant attacks are built around fake iden-
tities. The following suggestion could
be considered by OSNs for users who
do not want to use their real identities
but still would like to utilize services of
OSNs. OSNs may allow users to create
accounts with verifiable information but
represent them in different ways. Such
representations along with a note or sign
should be clearly visible to other users
such that information is not true pro-
file or information of the person. This
resembles virtual card numbers offered
by credit card companies where credit
card companies issue a temporary card
number for limited use and the credit
card companies can verify such informa-
tion. This may help to resolve some is-
sues coming through fake identities. It
is known that not all fake identities are
for deception or attacks. In these cases,
actual user information should be vali-
dated before creating those identities.
5. OSN-generated Recommendations.
Recommendations by OSNs also help
attackers. Users should be notified of
how recommendations are generated.
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Especially, users should be informed
about OSN recommended relationships.
For example, OSN recommends user
B to user A and then user A may
want to connect with user B. OSNs
should let user B know that this inter-
action happened with the help of their
recommendation system.
6. Certifying Bots and Third-party Appli-
cations. Bots or programs that collect
information or interact with users must
be certified by the OSN. Users should
be able to determine bots serving for en-
hancing functionalities of OSNs as well
as third-party programs.
7. Considering OSN Trolls Disseminating
Violence. It is quite common that In-
ternet trolls target OSN users in order
to lead them to criminal activities. Cur-
rently available methods related to user
identification and authorship detection
could be used to create new tools for law
enforcement’s disposal in order to hunt
OSN trolls causing criminal and terror-
ist activities.
8. Building a Consortium of OSN Ser-
vice Providers. There are attacks de-
signed using multiple OSNs. OSN ser-
vice providers should form a consor-
tium and determine what types of fa-
cilities and services should be provided
to forensics investigators. Such consor-
tium may also determine analyzing ac-
counts on multiple OSNs and informa-
tion disclosure using multiple OSNs.
9. Increasing Security Features of OSNs.
OSN service providers must enhance
security of messaging and validation
of creating new accounts. Especially,
for avoiding creation of fake nodes,
strong Captchas are highly recom-
mended. OSN service providers should
analyze identity cloning, fake identity
creation, detect spams and malware,
and inform relevant users.
10. Instant Notification of Malicious Acts
and Posts. OSN service providers must
enable tools for instant notification of
criminal activities. Law enforcement
agencies should have branches for deal-
ing crimes through OSNs and should co-
operate with OSN service providers for
emergency cases.
11. Training OSN Users. OSN service
providers may provide sample scenarios
and tests about how much information
is revealed based on current privacy and
security settings, acceptance of friend-
ships from strangers, and publishing
careless location information. OSN
service providers should encourage in-
stalling internet security software. It
would be interesting to give scores to
OSN users based on how alerted they
are to possible attacks or attribute clo-
sure. Similar measures may also be
provided how much information is vis-
ible about themselves. OSN service
providers should provide methods about
actions to be taken when abnormal be-
havior or posts are detected by users.
12. Scoring Identities, Relationships and
Messages. OSN service providers
should give scores for OSN users (identi-
ties), relationships, and messages. OSN
service providers should provide mecha-
nisms to demote or prevent fake (false)
identities, relationships, or messaging.
Honest OSN users should be promoted.
Methods that are applied for online
product reviews could be adapted in
the short run, and specific OSN meth-
ods could be developed in the long run.
OSN service providers should try to ver-
ify content of messages or let users ver-
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ify content of messages by providing
links to external resources. Unverified
messages could be labeled as ‘unveri-
fied’ so that users may not completely
trust the content of messages. OSN
service providers should develop tools
for content-based analysis of multime-
dia posts and streaming.
13. Accountability in Criminal Cases.
There should be legal frameworks for
OSN service providers on how to act
and what to provide to law enforcement
professionals. Laws should be enhanced
to protect rights of OSN users. OSN
service providers should act accordingly
while protecting their users.
14. Not Protecting Attackers through De-
fense Methods. We have observed that
some techniques that are developed to
protect the privacy of OSN users actu-
ally provide another level of protection
for attackers. While security methods
are developed and used, OSN service
providers should also analyze how those
methods could be used by attackers as
well.
15. Developing Methodological Approaches
for Solving OSN Crimes. Forensics ana-
lysts should be provided a general hand-
book of steps taken for specific crimes
through OSNs. In this paper, for so-
cial attacks, we suggest studying attacks
at four levels starting from the crime at
the highest level, the type of attacks at
the second level, scheme of attack at the
third level, and attack component at the
bottom level. After having answers for
these four levels, forensics investigators
should develop a systematic approach
regarding how to deal with each possible
type of crime.
We believe that social network forensics
will be one of the hot areas very soon as the
required tools become available. We orga-
nized the papers in a way that researchers
who are interested in social network foren-
sics have a starting point to explore and de-
velop their research methodologies for their
domains. With this, we also aim to help
digital forensics tool developers in order to
create state of the art tools via provided ap-
proaches. There were many other research
studies that could benefit social forensics re-
search. We have decided to keep the topics
focused rather than disturbing readers’ at-
tention with related areas. Researchers who
are interested in social network forensics are
highly recommended to explore these related
research areas.
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